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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Courts have always had a special role in making competition policy.  
The open-textured language of the Sherman Act1 and other antitrust laws 
has forced courts to fill a policy-making void that Congress has—with 
rare exception—shown little desire to take back.2  When Congress has 
 
 1. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000). 
 2. As Robert Bork wrote: 
The central institution in making antitrust law has been the Supreme Court.   
That is true because the antitrust laws are so open-textured, leave so much to be 
filled in by the judiciary, that the Court plays in antitrust almost as unconstrained 
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enacted regulatory legislation, it has traditionally relied on methods 
other than marketplace competition to achieve its goals. 
The Telecommunications Act of 19963 breaks from that historical 
paradigm.  The Act is legislative competition policy-making that 
stimulates rivalry in local telephone service principally by requiring 
“incumbent local exchange carriers” (ILECs), the existing local 
telephone companies, to interconnect with, and provide certain services 
to “competitive local exchange carriers” (CLECs).4  When market entry 
emerged more slowly than many had hoped, CLECs and consumers sued 
the ILECs.  The claims alleged that the ILECs failed to fulfill their duties 
under the Telecom Act by unlawfully maintaining their monopoly power 
in the local telephone service market in violation of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.5  A CLEC executive described the genesis of one of these 
 
a role as it does in constitutional law. . . .  [E]ven if courts accept consumer 
welfare as their sole guideline, they have been granted an exceptionally broad 
mandate to make law. 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 409 (1978) 
(footnote omitted).  While the language of the Clayton Act is somewhat clearer than that 
of the Sherman Act, the court’s role is no less ambitious because “Congress has 
indicated its belief that [certain practices] may—not always, but under circumstances 
deliberately left undefined—injure competition.”  Id.  Courts are thus left with the goal 
of making the policy choices.  See IA PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 
240c3 (2d ed. 1997) (recognizing that antitrust cases often turn “on a court’s judgment 
about the degree of social harm that might result from the challenged practice, the social 
benefits that might be obtained through that practice, and the availability of significantly 
less restrictive alternatives”). 
 3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).  Throughout this Article, 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is also referred to as “the Telecom Act” or “the 
1996 Act.” 
 4. The preamble to the Act states that it was designed “to promote competition 
and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for 
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new 
telecommunications technologies.”  Id.  The House Conference Report explained that the 
purpose of the Act was “to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy 
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced 
telecommunications and information technologies and services . . . by opening all 
telecommunications markets to competition . . . .”  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 1 (1996). 
 5. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 
(D.D.C. 2002); Nicholas Kulish et al., Ruling Opens Baby Bells Up to Suits: Court Lets 
Customers Sue Local Phone Companies for Antitrust Violations, WALL ST. J., June 21, 
2002, at A3 (referring to “dozens of lawsuits Bell competitors have filed against the 
regional phone companies”); Pulver.Com, Telecom Antitrust Intelligence Report, 
available at http://www.pulver.com/antitrustreport/research.html (last visited Nov. 18, 
2002) (listing complaints filed and pleadings); Gail Lawyer, The Last Resort: Competitors 
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cases—though he could have been referring to any of them—by 
commenting that the ILEC “was trying to put us out of business like they 
did all the other CLECs . . . . [The conduct of the ILEC] is costing consumers 
in the states we serve billions of dollars in lost potential savings.”6  The 
judicial response to these cases has been perplexing.  Each court claims 
to be applying the same law; all of the judges write with utter confidence 
in the correctness of their analysis;7 and yet the courts reach two 
diametrically opposite results.  The Second and Eleventh Circuits have 
held that the antitrust laws apply to local telephone companies as if the 
1996 Act did not exist.8  But the Seventh Circuit and several district 
courts have dismissed identical antitrust claims.9  The Supreme Court 
recently granted certiorari to resolve this dispute.10 
 
Turn to Antitrust Actions Amid Mounting Frustration with ‘96 Act, XCHANGE MAGAZINE 
(July 1, 2001), at http://www.xchangemag.com/articles/171front.html (identifying recent 
antitrust cases). 
 6. Lawyer, supra note 5 (quoting Keith Machen, Vice President of Ntegrity, 
charging Verizon with antitrust violations). 
 7. For example, in Covad’s case against BellSouth, Judge Martin recognized that 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
had disagreed with the Seventh Circuit’s holding that antitrust claims could not be based 
on conduct relating to duties created by the 1996 Act.  Covad Communications Co. v. 
BellSouth Corp., No. 1:00-CV-3414, slip op. at 25 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2001) (recognizing 
that the DOJ and the FCC believed that antitrust claims “should be available for failing 
to perform duties under the 1996 Act”).  But Judge Martin rejected their views quite 
abruptly, writing that “[i]f Congress . . . desire[s] to amend the 1996 Act . . . to 
specifically include antitrust remedies for failing to perform affirmative duties, then [it] 
may do so.  In the meantime, this court’s role is to apply the current, correct and logical 
interpretation of the 1996 Act and the Sherman Act.”  Id. 
 8. See infra Part III.B.1.  The Second Circuit’s holding was limited to cases 
initiated by consumers.  Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 
F.3d 89, 112 n.19 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Our decision does not address whether LECs seeking 
to enter the market may ever bring antitrust suits against the ILEC.”).  While the Second 
Circuit reserved judgment with respect to cases filed by CLECs, which represent a 
majority of the cases, the court’s analysis is mirrored in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
in Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002), 
and in amicus briefs filed jointly by the Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the FCC in 
cases that were initiated by competitors.  See Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the 
Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 13, Covad Communications 
Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-16064-C); Brief for the 
United States and Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellants at 10–11, Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 
(11th Cir. filed Jan. 12,  2001) (No. 01-10224-JJ). 
 9.  See infra Part III.B.2.  Judge Tjoflat, in an opinion dissenting from the denial 
of rehearing en banc in the Eleventh Circuit Covad case, expressed agreement with these 
courts.  Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 314 F.3d 1282, 1288–90 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
 10. Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 123 S. 
Ct. 1480 (2003) (mem.) (limiting grant of certiorari to the question: “Did the Court of 
Appeals err in reversing the District Court’s dismissal of respondent’s antitrust 
claims?”). 
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This Article has two purposes: (1) to explain these conflicting results, 
and (2) to propose a method to determine the appropriate degree of 
connection between the antitrust laws and an industry-specific regulatory 
statute that, like the Telecom Act, seeks to enhance competition.  The 
conflicting results in the telecom-antitrust cases arise because the courts 
are struggling to deal with legislative competition policy-making.  The 
old strains of antitrust-regulatory accommodation doctrine were 
designed for situations in which the legislature sought to advance public 
policy goals other than competition.11  By contrast, accommodating the 
1996 Act requires the court to determine how best to achieve the single 
goal of enhancing competition.  None of the courts deciding telecom-
antitrust cases have recognized that this distinction creates the need for 
different doctrinal tools.12 
Harmonizing antitrust and competition-enhancing, industry-specific 
regulation requires careful contextual analysis.  To say, as the Seventh 
Circuit has, that the specific duties and regulatory structures created by 
the Telecom Act displace antitrust scrutiny begs the question: Would 
displacement of the antitrust laws help achieve the Telecom Act’s goal 
of stimulating competition in local telephone service?  It would be odd 
for Congress to displace antitrust enforcement if it did not.  Similarly, to 
say, as the Second and Eleventh Circuits have, that antitrust continues to 
apply as if there were no Telecom Act begs the same question: Would 
 
 11. To be sure, regulation has often sought to protect consumers from price 
gouging, which is one of the goals of antitrust and competition policy.  But traditional 
consumer-welfare-oriented regulation relied on a direct price control mechanism of one 
sort or another rather than marketplace competition to achieve its goals.  Further, 
competition-enhancing policy has much broader goals than preventing price gouging.  See 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1990). 
[T]he “Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition 
will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.”  This 
judgment “recognizes that all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, 
and durability—and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the 
free opportunity to select among alternative offers.” 
Id. (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)); N. 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (explaining that antitrust law “rests 
on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best 
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the 
greatest material progress”). 
 12. See infra note 34.  As of the time of this writing, the one commentary on this 
type of litigation similarly fails to perceive this distinction.  See Megan Delany, The 
Dominos of Goldwasser: Only Congress Can Stop the Toppling Effect Before the Game 
Is Over, 10 J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 279, 292–97 (2002) (concluding that Goldwasser was 
wrongly decided without considering antitrust-regulatory accommodation doctrine).   
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simply overlaying antitrust enforcement on top of competition-
enhancing regulation advance the goal of spurring competition?  It 
depends.  The regulation may carefully structure an industry in ways that 
could be undone if standard antitrust duties were imposed.  In such a 
case, courts should refrain from applying antitrust law.  In other cases, 
regulation may enable the courts to apply the antitrust laws more 
aggressively.  By declaring that certain conduct is anticompetitive within 
the regulated industry, the legislature makes competition policy—it 
creates a bright line that minimizes the concern that aggressive 
enforcement would chill procompetitive behavior. 
This Article explores six ways that courts might account for a 
competition-enhancing regulatory statute when considering an antitrust 
challenge.  These six degrees of connection range from creating a 
blanket exemption from antitrust attack to treating violations of the 
regulatory statute as per se antitrust violations.  In choosing among these 
options, a court should engage in a two-step analysis.  First, it should ask 
whether recognizing antitrust duties concurrently with regulatory duties 
would reduce the regulatory statute’s effectiveness in fostering 
competition.  If it would, then the court should find that the regulated 
conduct falls outside the scope of antitrust.  If antitrust enforcement 
would not hinder the regulation’s effectiveness, the court should proceed 
to the second step and ask how, if at all, the duties created by the 
regulation should affect antitrust analysis. 
A court applying this test in a telecom-antitrust case should find, at the 
first step, that the 1996 Act would be enhanced if the court also imposed 
antitrust duties on ILECs.  At the second step, the court should find that 
a plaintiff, who proves that an ILEC with market power has violated a 
nontrivial regulatory duty imposed by the 1996 Act, is entitled to a 
presumption that the violation substantially contributed to the 
maintenance of the ILEC’s market power.  The language and structure of 
the 1996 Act, however, indicate that defendants should retain the right to 
show that there are procompetitive reasons for violating a duty imposed 
by the 1996 Act, and plaintiffs should retain the burden of rebutting 
those justifications. 
Part II of this Article introduces the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
focusing on the provisions that are intended to stimulate competition in 
local telephone service.  It then summarizes the allegations in the 
telecom-antitrust cases.  Part III sets out the established law of antitrust-
regulatory accommodation and describes how the differing results in the 
telecom-antitrust cases can be explained by the courts’—sometimes 
explicit and sometimes implicit—reliance on two different lines of 
doctrine: implied immunity and antitrust state action.  Part IV explains 
that neither doctrine is an appropriate analytical model for the telecom-
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antitrust cases because the Telecom Act, unlike the regulation considered 
in prior cases, is designed to enhance competition.  This section then sets 
out the two-step inquiry to determine the appropriate degree of antitrust-
regulatory connection.  Part V applies that analysis to the Telecom Act. 
II.  THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 
This Part briefly traces the events leading up to the 1996 Act and 
describes the Act’s local competition provisions.  It then summarizes the 
various antitrust cases that have been filed against the ILECs. 
A.  Events Leading to the Enactment of the Telecom Act 
A summary of the Telecom Act’s local competition provisions must 
start with the 1984 breakup of the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company (AT&T).  Through the early 1980s, virtually all telephone 
service in the United States was provided by regulated monopolies.  By 
the end of the decade, much had changed.  Public and private antitrust 
cases against AT&T led to a restructuring of the telephony industry 
under the auspices of a consent decree known as the “modified final 
judgment” (MFJ).13  That decree sought to stimulate competition in long 
distance telephone service by stripping AT&T of its local service 
monopolies and forcing it to compete on a more level playing field with 
MCI and other competitive entrants into the long distance telephone 
service market.14 
 
 13. MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 
(7th Cir. 1983) (holding that local distribution facilities were “essential facilities” and 
therefore AT&T must provide MCI access to them); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 195–200 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom., Maryland v. 
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (approving a consent decree that imposed on local 
service providers a duty to share access to local telephone networks with competitive 
long distance providers).  For an analysis of the legal theories undermining the cases see 
Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States 
v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290, 295–326 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & 
Lawrence J. White eds., 1989). 
 14. “[A]ccess to AT&T’s local network is crucial if long distance carriers . . . are 
to be viable competitors.”  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 223.  The divestiture of 
the local operating companies from the Bell System “will sever the relationship between 
this local monopoly and the other, competitive segments of AT&T, and it will thus 
ensure—certainly better than could any other type of relief—that the practices which 
allegedly have lain heavy on the telecommunications industry will not recur.”  Id. 
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The MFJ divided AT&T’s local service operations into seven 
geographically separate companies.15  Each was a monopoly provider of 
local service in its own region, but the decree prohibited these local 
service providers from competing in the long distance market.16  The 
MFJ left local service in the hands of monopoly providers because the 
government then believed that efficient competition in the local market 
was not possible.17  By the 1990s, technological advancements had 
undermined the MFJ’s assumption that competition could not exist at the 
local level.18  Congress concluded, however, that local competition 
would be unlikely to emerge in the short term without industry-specific 
legislation.19 
B.  The Telecom Act’s Local Competition Provisions 
In 1996 Congress acted.  The Telecom Act supplanted the MFJ with a 
new framework designed to increase competition throughout the 
telecommunications industry, but particularly with respect to local 
telephone service.20  The Act prohibited states from enforcing regulatory 
statutes that blocked competitive entry into local service markets21 and 
imposed a series of affirmative duties on local telephone companies, 
beginning with a general duty to interconnect.22  The Act also imposed 
specific duties including: 
 
 15. Id. at 141, 142 & n.41. 
 16. Id. at 143.  
 17. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 413–14 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell 
Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that “[t]he rationale for 
allowing monopolies in the local phone service market was the belief that having more 
than one local provider would lead to unwarranted duplication in the physical connecting 
wires through which local calls are transmitted”); United States v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 673 F. 
Supp. 525, 537–38 (D.D.C. 1987); PETER HUBER ET AL., THE GEODDESIC NETWORK II: 
1993 REPORT ON COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY 2.3–2.5 (1992). 
 18. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 371 (“Technological advances . . . have made 
competition among multiple providers of local service seem possible . . . .”). 
 19. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,508 (1996). 
[T]he removal of statutory and regulatory barriers to entry into the local 
exchange and exchange access markets, while a necessary precondition to 
competition, is not sufficient to ensure that competition will supplant 
monopolies. . . . Congress addressed these problems in the 1996 Act by 
mandating that the most significant economic impediments to efficient entry 
into the monopolized local market must be removed. 
Id. 
 20. See supra Part I; supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 21. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000); see Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 416 (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that “the Act permits new local 
entry by dismantling existing legal barriers that would otherwise inhibit it”). 
 22. 47 U.S.C. § 251(a). 
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(1) a ban on prohibiting the resale of telephone service, 
(2) a requirement that customers who switch carriers be allowed 
keep their telephone numbers, 
(3) a prohibition on discriminatory access requirements, such as 
the need to dial more numbers with certain providers, 
(4) a duty to share access to rights of way for cable or wire, and 
(5) a duty to enter “reciprocal compensation arrangements for the 
transport and termination of telecommunications.”23 
In addition to these general duties placed on all competitors in the 
local service market, Congress imposed additional obligations on the 
ILECs.  It explicitly required them to negotiate in good faith with respect 
to the generally applicable requirements of the Act,24 and it created five 
specific positive duties: 
(1) to interconnect with potential competitors “at any technically 
feasible point within the carrier’s network . . . that is at least 
equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange carrier 
to itself” or any other party,  
(2) to provide potential competitors with unbundled access—at a 
cost-based royalty plus reasonable profit—to elements of the 
ILEC’s own network, 
(3) to offer for resale at wholesale rates any service that the ILEC 
provides to its customers, 
(4) to notify other carriers of changes to the network that would 
affect interoperability with other networks, and 
(5) to rent potential competitors the space needed for their 
interconnection and other necessary equipment.25 
Recognizing that these provisions would require extensive cooperation 
among telecommunications providers, Congress required an ILEC to enter 
negotiations with a CLEC whenever interconnection was requested.26  
The parties were permitted, but not required, to ask state regulators to 
participate as mediators in pursuit of a voluntary agreement.27  If an 
agreement was not reached between 135 and 160 days after the initial 
request, either party was empowered to seek compulsory arbitration by 
 
 23. Id. § 251(b). 
 24. Id. § 251(c)(1). 
 25. Id. § 251(c)(2)–(6). 
 26. Id. § 252(a)–(b). 
 27. Id. § 252(a)(2). 
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state regulators, who must then resolve all open issues within nine months 
of the initial request.28  In all events, state regulatory commissions must 
approve all agreements and the FCC was empowered to step in if a state 
commission failed to fulfill its obligations.29  Once an agreement was in 
place, the specific terms of the agreement rather than the language of the 
statute would govern the relationship between the ILEC and the CLEC.30 
The 1996 Act sought to encourage the ILECs to comply with the 
duties it imposed by permitting an ILEC to provide long distance service 
to its own local customers if it demonstrated that its local telephone 
service market was open to competition.31  To meet this obligation, an 
ILEC had to make available a “competitive checklist” of interconnection 
and related services.32  While this potential for entry into the long 
distance market provided a “carrot” to encourage ILECs to cooperate 
with competitors in local service markets, the 1996 Act was remarkably 
short of “sticks” to either compel compliance if an ILEC had little 
interest in providing long distance service or to ensure continued 
compliance once an ILEC satisfied the competitive checklist.33 
C.  The Telecom-Antitrust Complaints 
Consumers and CLECs have charged the ILECs with monopolizing 
the local telephone service market by frustrating the procompetitive aims 
of the 1996 Act and thereby maintaining their own monopolistic 
position.  To date, courts have ruled on at least a dozen motions to 
dismiss antitrust cases based on violations of the 1996 Act.34  The cases 
 
 28. Id. § 252(b). 
 29. Id. § 252(e). 
 30. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 103 
(2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that “[w]hile the duties regulating ILECs enumerated in 
subsections (b) and (c) of section 251 appear at first glance to be freestanding, in 
practice, section 251 envisions that these duties will be implemented through state 
approved contracts between the [CLEC] and the ILEC”). 
 31. 47 U.S.C. § 271(b)(1), (c), (d)(3).  The 1996 Act immediately permitted an 
ILEC to compete to provide long distance service to customers in regions in which it did 
not provide local service.  Id. § 271(b)(2). 
 32. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B). 
 33. Joel I. Klein, The Race for Local Competition: A Long Distance Run, Not a 
Sprint, Address Before the American Enterprise Institute 7 (Nov. 5, 1997), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1268.htm (then-Assistant Attorney General for 
the Antitrust Division of the DOJ describing the carrot and stick approach of the 1996 
Act as follows: “As for the ‘sticks,’ there are real questions at this point; the Act itself 
calls for no real penalties for non-compliance . . . .”).   
 34. Numerous cases dismissed antitrust claims based on violations of the 1996 
Act.  Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123 (D.D.C. 2002); 
Cavalier Tel., L.L.C. v. Verizon Va. Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Va. 2002); Covad 
Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., No. 1:00-CV-3414, slip op. (N.D. Ga. July 6, 
2001), rev’d, 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002); Supra Telecomms. & Info. Sys., Inc. v. 
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span the country.  Potential competitors in local telephone services sued 
BellSouth, Verizon, and Pacific Bell in Florida, Virginia, and California, 
respectively.  A provider of high speed Internet access sued BellSouth 
and Bell Atlantic in Georgia and the District of Columbia.  And 
telephone service consumers filed class actions against Ameritech and 
Bell Atlantic in Chicago and New York.  The allegations in each case 
are essentially identical, that the ILECs were complying with the 1996 
Act, if at all, in the most grudging way possible in order to stifle 
competition.  Some of the complaints highlight that this conduct violates 
the Act,35 while others focus on more traditional antitrust theories36—the 
refusal to deal37 and the essential facilities38 doctrines—but at root, all of 
the cases advanced essentially the same monopoly maintenance claim. 
 
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., No. 99-1706-CIV-SEITZ, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23816 
(S.D. Fla. June 8, 2001); MGC Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 
146 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth 
Telecomms., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 738 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1480 (2003) 
(limited to the question: “Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the District Court’s 
dismissal of respondent’s antitrust claims?”); Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., No. 97-C-
6788, 1998 WL 60878 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1998) (dismissing the consumer class action 
complaint), aff’d on other grounds, 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000).  In other cases, courts 
refused to dismiss antitrust claims based on violations of the Act.  Covad 
Communications Co.  v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002); Law Offices 
of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 294 F.3d 307, 311 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(consumer case reserving judgment on competitor claims); Davis v. Pac. Bell, 204 F. 
Supp. 2d 1236, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (agreeing with Goldwasser and its progeny that “a 
violation of the Telecommunications Act ‘does not automatically equate to a violation of 
the Sherman Act,’” but holding “that an allegation that a defendant violated the 
Telecommunications Act in a ‘predatory’ manner as defined in Aspen Skiing states a 
cause of action under the Sherman Act”); Stein v. Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 173 F. Supp. 2d 975, 
985–86 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (same, but dismissing with leave to amend because the claim, as 
alleged, failed to attribute damages to the plausible antitrust claim); Electronet Intermedia 
Consulting, Inc. v. Sprint-Fla., Inc., No. 4:00-CV-0176-RH (N.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2000). 
 35. See, e.g., Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 394–95; Supra Telecomms. & Info. Sys., 
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23816, at *9, *14. 
 36. See, e.g., Cavalier Tel., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 611.  The court explained that while 
the plaintiff “avoids such tell-tale references [to the 1996 Act] in its Complaint, it is 
nevertheless clear that [it] alleges nothing more than violations of duties imposed on 
Verizon by the 1996 Act.”  Id. at 613.  That the plaintiff “did not characterize its allegations 
as violations of the 1996 Act,” the court explained, was “beside the point.  Such a shallow 
interpretation of the relationship between the 1996 Act and antitrust law would relegate the 
matter to a mindless word game played out at the pleading stage . . . . The correct test is 
whether the factual allegations contained in the Complaint amount to antitrust violations.”  Id. 
 37. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985). 
 38. See MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 
(7th Cir. 1983). 
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Covad Communications’ allegations against BellSouth are illustrative.  
The 1996 Act required the ILECs to make space available on their 
premises as necessary for interconnection, a requirement known as 
collocation.39  While BellSouth entered interconnection agreements with 
Covad, the new competitor accused BellSouth, inter alia, of: (1) 
“regularly misrepresent[ing] the availability of space,” (2) ”severely 
delay[ing] Covad’s application for collocation by months,” and (3) 
“strategically understaffing its wholesale divisions and refusing to 
develop electronic systems for placing orders.”40  As a result of these 
alleged improprieties, Covad claimed that BellSouth had intentionally 
“thwarted Covad’s aggressive first-to-market strategy, caused [it] to lose 
customers, and devastated [its] ability to deliver high quality service” in 
competition with BellSouth.41 
In an unregulated market, these claims would state a cause of action 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.  The plaintiffs alleged both 
elements of a section 2 claim—that the defendants had (1) monopoly 
power in the relevant market for local telephone service and (2) engaged 
in predatory acts—acts intended to exclude competition with no 
procompetitive purpose or legitimate business justification.42  The 
question for the courts is whether the existence of the 1996 Act alters 
that conclusion.  The Second and Eleventh Circuits and the enforcement 
agencies have said no.  But the Seventh Circuit and a majority of district 
courts have dismissed these antitrust claims on the pleadings. 
 
 39.  47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6) (2000). 
 40. Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., No. 1:00-CV-3414, slip op. at 
4 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2001); see also Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. 
Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2002) (where the plaintiff alleged that Bell Atlantic 
discriminated in favor of its own customers); Cavalier Tel., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 612 
(explaining Cavalier’s allegations “that Verizon mis-routed Cavalier’s calls, . . . supplied 
Cavalier with an inferior Web interface for use in ordering loops, . . . and . . . 
intentionally made the billing process for loops costly for its competitors”). 
 41. Covad, No. 1:00-CV-3414 at 4; see also Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 
F.3d 390, 394–95 (7th Cir. 2000) (alleging that Ameritech engaged in twenty specific 
exclusionary practices, each of which amounted to a violation of a duty imposed under 
the 1996 Act); Supra Telecomms. & Info. Sys., Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., No. 
99-1706-CIV-SEITZ, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23816, at *9 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2001) 
(alleging that BellSouth’s refusal to provide access hindered competition with BellSouth 
directly and also made future competition more difficult by destroying business 
relationships between Supra and its customers). 
 42. The elements of a section 2 Sherman Act violation are: (1) the willful acquisition, 
maintenance, or extension of monopoly power (2) by the use of exclusionary or 
predatory conduct, “to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to 
destroy a competitor.”  United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); see Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992). 
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III.  THE LAW OF ANTITRUST-REGULATORY ACCOMMODATION  AND 
THE TELECOM-ANTITRUST CASES 
This Part reviews existing antitrust-regulatory accommodation law 
and explains that the Supreme Court has misleadingly developed two 
lines of doctrine: (1) implied immunity, which is said to focus on 
conflict, and (2) antitrust state action, which looks to government 
supervision.43  In fact, the Supreme Court cases turn on the presence of 
official oversight of anticompetitive conduct allegedly serving the 
noncompetition public policy goals of industry-specific regulatory 
statutes.  Conflict, as that term is normally understood, is not a critical 
factor.  After reviewing the Supreme Court cases, this Part shows that 
the Second and Eleventh Circuits have mistakenly relied on the absence 
of conflict, while the Seventh Circuit has, perhaps unconsciously, relied 
on the presence of supervision.  As Part IV explains, this doctrine was 
developed to accommodate antitrust and regulation that serves a goal 
other than competition.  Neither approach is adequate where regulation, 
like the Telecom Act, is intended to enhance competition. 
A.  The Existing Law of Antitrust-Regulatory Accommodation 
Historically, the courts have employed two different lines of authority 
to determine the impact of industry-specific regulation on the antitrust 
laws.  Particularly in cases of federal regulation, the courts have employed 
the implied immunity doctrine, which holds that a conflict between a 
regulatory scheme and the Sherman Act will block antitrust scrutiny of 
 
 43.  A third approach to antitrust-regulatory accommodation is known as the 
Keogh or filed rate doctrine.  It holds that a private treble damage action will not lie 
when the plaintiff attacks a rate that has been filed and approved by a regulatory body 
even if the rate was collusively set, and the plaintiff proves that it would have been lower 
absent the collusion.  See Keogh v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 160–62 (1922).  
While some of the telecom-antitrust cases have mentioned this doctrine, for example, 
Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 402, it has no relevance to the argument advanced here.  The 
Keogh doctrine does not alter the antitrust duties imposed on regulated entities; it merely 
insulates them from treble damage liability, leaving antitrust duties in place and 
enforceable through criminal or injunctive actions.  Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier 
Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 422 & n.28 (1986) (“Keogh simply held that an award 
of treble damages is not an available remedy” when a rate is filed with and approved by 
a regulatory body; a regulated defendant’s conduct remains “within the reach of the 
generally applicable antitrust laws.”). 
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the defendant’s conduct.44  In cases of state regulation, the courts have 
asked whether conduct that would violate the antitrust laws furthers 
private interests or the state’s regulatory vision.  This doctrine, known as 
antitrust state action, holds that conduct that is (1) undertaken pursuant 
to a state policy to displace competition with regulation and (2) actively 
supervised by governmental actors will be deemed to serve the state’s 
regulatory vision and will not be scrutinized under the antitrust laws.45 
While these two lines of authority appear to ask quite different 
questions, the holdings in the cases turn on a single issue: whether the 
legislature has provided for sufficient governmental oversight of 
potentially anticompetitive conduct.  Where it has, antitrust scrutiny has 
been deemed unnecessary. 
1.  Implied Immunities Are Disfavored 
Implied antitrust immunities as a result of industry-specific regulation are 
said to be “strongly disfavored.”46  The U.S. Supreme Court has explained 
that the antitrust laws embody a “fundamental national economic policy” in 
favor of competition.47  While Congress may put that policy aside in pursuit 
of other public policy goals, in the absence of specific language, courts 
assume that Congress intended to limit antitrust enforcement only to the 
minimum extent necessary to achieve some alternative public policy goal.48 
 
 44. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 45. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 46. See Square D, 476 U.S. at 421 (explaining that “exemptions from the antitrust 
laws are strictly construed and strongly disfavored”). 
 47. Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 388 
(1981) (quoting Carnation Co. v. Pac. Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966)). 
 48. In National Gerimedical Hospital, the Court summarized the implied 
immunity doctrine as follows: 
The antitrust laws represent a fundamental national economic policy.  Implied 
antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be justified only by a convincing 
showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory 
system.  Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the 
[subsequent law] work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.  
This is the guiding principle to reconciliation of the two statutory schemes. 
Id. at 388–89 (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also 
Square D, 476 U.S. at 421; United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350–51 
(1963); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); United States v. 
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956). 
The Court has employed the implied immunity doctrine to justify the narrow 
interpretation of regulatory statutes that explicitly state an intent to immunize certain 
conduct from antitrust attack.  See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 
726, 733 (1973); Carnation Co. v. Pac. Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966). 
We have long recognized that the antitrust laws represent a fundamental 
national economic policy and have therefore concluded that we cannot lightly 
assume that the enactment of a special regulatory scheme for particular aspects 
of an industry was intended to render the more general provisions of the 
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For example, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,49 the plaintiff 
brought antitrust claims against the Exchange and its members for 
collectively refusing to provide private communication lines connecting 
the plaintiff’s offices to members of the Exchange.50  These lines were 
alleged to be essential to the firm’s ability to compete effectively,51 and 
outside the context of a regulated industry, the Exchange members’ 
concerted refusal to provide the lines to nonmembers would have 
violated the antitrust laws.52 
The Exchange argued that its conduct should be exempt because the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required it to regulate its members.53  
The Second Circuit agreed because the Exchange’s conduct “was within 
the general scope of the authority of the Exchange as defined by the 
1934 Act.”54  But the Supreme Court reversed, holding that “a general 
power to adopt rules” that might have anticompetitive effects does not 
mean that “particular applications of such rules” will never violate the 
antitrust laws.55  An exemption from antitrust scrutiny could be implied 
“only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even 
then only to the minimum extent necessary.”56  After reviewing the 
application of the rule in the case before it, the Court concluded that the 
Exchange’s conduct was not necessary to make the Exchange Act work, 
and held that antitrust scrutiny was appropriate.57 
2.  Regulated Conduct Supervised by Public Actors Falls Outside the 
Scope of the Antitrust Laws 
Silver is often read to require a search for conflict between the 
regulatory legislation and the antitrust laws.  In fact, however, the 
presence or absence of a conflict has little to do with the decision 
whether to apply the antitrust laws to the regulated industry.  Indeed, the 
conflict in Silver could not have been more clear.  The rule directly 
 
antitrust laws wholly inapplicable to that industry. 
Id. 
 49. 373 U.S. at 341. 
 50. Id. at 344–45. 
 51. Id. at 344–45, 348. 
 52. Id. at 345. 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 78a–mm (1997). 
 54. Silver, 373 U.S. at 346–47. 
 55. Id. at 357, 367. 
 56. Id. at 357. 
 57. Id. at 361–67. 
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restrained competition that the antitrust laws would otherwise require.  
The result in Silver was dependent not on the absence of conflict, but on 
a lack of direct governmental oversight of the challenged conduct.  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had the power to review the 
Exchange’s rules, but not specific applications of those rules.58  Given 
the private genesis of the Exchange’s anticompetitive decisions and the 
lack of governmental oversight, a complete exemption from antitrust 
scrutiny would have “defeat[ed] the congressional policy reflected in the 
antitrust laws without serving the policy of the Securities Exchange 
Act.”59  But, the Court stressed, if review of Exchange self-regulation 
were provided by a governmental entity, “a different case as to antitrust 
exemption would be presented.”60 
In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,61 the Court encountered 
that “different case,”62 challenging the Exchange’s collective setting of 
commissions.  As in Silver, the regulation (1) granted the Exchange the 
self-regulatory power necessary to take the challenged action, and (2) 
contemplated that anticompetitive effects might flow from that action in 
the process of serving other public policy goals.  In contrast to Silver, 
however, the SEC had the power to oversee rate setting and had actively 
supervised the process.63  As a result, the Court held that the Exchange’s 
 
 58. Id. at 357–58. 
 59. Id. at 360. 
 60. Id.; see also Nat’l Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 
U.S. 378, 389–91 (1981) (explaining that “[i]ntent to repeal the antitrust laws is much 
clearer when a regulatory agency has been empowered to authorize or require the type of 
conduct under antitrust challenge”); cf. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 
351–52 (1963) (applying antitrust laws despite governmental regulation, and explaining 
that “the range and scope of administrative powers under the Bank Merger Act bear little 
resemblance to those involved” in a prior case where the antitrust laws were held 
inapplicable). 
 61. 422 U.S. 659 (1975). 
 62. Id. at 685 (“It is patent that the case presently at bar is, indeed, that ‘different 
case’ to which the Court in Silver referred.”). 
 63. The Court explained that “[i]n contrast to the circumstances of Silver,” the 
SEC here had “direct regulatory power over” collective rate setting.  Id.  “Since 1934,” 
the Court observed, “all rate changes have been brought to the attention of the SEC, and 
it has taken an active role in review of proposed rate changes . . . .”  Id.  In distinguishing 
a lower court securities case that found no immunity, the Court explained that “there was 
no evidence presented regarding the extent of SEC review of the challenged rule.”  Id. at 
686–87.  The Court distinguished Philadelphia National Bank on similar grounds: “there 
was an absence of continuing oversight by the Comptroller General of the Currency.”  Id. 
at 689–90 n.14.  Finally, Justice Douglas emphasized the point in his concurring opinion: 
The mere existence of a statutory power of review by the SEC over fixed 
commission rates cannot justify immunizing those rates from antitrust 
challenges. . . . Only if the SEC is actively and aggressively exercising its 
powers of review and approval can we be sure that fixed commission rates are 
being monitored in the manner which Congress intended. 
Id. at 691–92 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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collective rate setting was not subject to antitrust scrutiny.64 
The federal regulation cases demonstrate that the deciding factor is the 
degree of government oversight rather than the extent of the conflict 
between regulatory and antitrust duties.65  But what does governmental 
involvement have to do with accommodating two statutory regimes?  
The answer rests on an understanding of the nature of antitrust as a 
mechanism to control privately motivated business decisions, but not 
governmental conduct.  Where public actors oversee regulated conduct, 
the activity loses its character as privately motivated conduct.  Antitrust 
is therefore inapplicable.66 
This characterization of antitrust-regulatory accommodation has 
received more attention in cases and commentary when courts review 
state regulation.67  The Court’s 1943 decision in Parker v. Brown68 held 
 
 64. Id. at 685–86.  In United States v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 
422 U.S. 694 (1975), the Court held the antitrust laws inapplicable to certain mutual fund 
activities.  Id. at 733.  The Court explained: 
There can be little question that the broad regulatory authority conferred upon 
the SEC by the Maloney and Investment Company Acts enables it to monitor 
the activities questioned . . . and the history of Commission regulations 
suggests no laxity in the exercise of this authority.  To the extent that any of 
appellees’ ancillary activities frustrate the SEC’s regulatory objectives it has 
ample authority to eliminate them. 
Id. at 734 (footnotes omitted).  Similarly, in Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973), the Court held regulated conduct outside the scope of antitrust 
law.  Id. at 387.  The Court explained: 
[W]here, as here, the [governmental body] authorizes control of an air carrier 
to be acquired by another person or corporation, and where it specifically 
authorizes as in the public interest specific transactions between the parent and 
the subsidiary, the way in which that control is exercised in those precise 
situations is under the surveillance of the [governmental body], not in the 
hands of those who can invoke the sanctions of the antitrust laws. 
Id. at 387. 
 65. For example, the Court in Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau 
permitted antitrust attacks on regulated rates that were filed and approved, although it did 
prohibit the award of damages.  476 U.S. 409, 422 (1986); see also Nat’l Gerimedical 
Hosp., 452 U.S. at 389 (explaining that “[i]ntent to repeal the antitrust laws is much 
clearer when a regulatory agency has been empowered to authorize or require the type of 
conduct under antitrust challenge,” and “antitrust repeals are especially disfavored where 
the antitrust implications of a business decision have not been considered by a 
governmental entity”). 
 66. See Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 24 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 236–39 (2000); Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust 
Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667, 672, 697–703 (1991). 
 67. IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 242d (“Although distinctive in 
origin, historical justification, and verbal formulation, the rationale for the ‘state action’ 
doctrine creating immunity from federal antitrust [review] for state and local government 
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that federal law did not preempt a state regulatory program because the 
Sherman Act was not meant “to restrain state action or official action 
directed by a state.”69  The doctrine is governed by a two-part test that 
asks whether the state (1) “clearly articulated” its intent to displace 
competition with regulation, and (2) “actively supervised” the private 
parties in the regulated market.70 
As applied, the test asks first whether the state has articulated a 
general intent to displace the forces of the free market with some form of 
state regulation.71  To be considered state action in this context, an 
anticompetitive byproduct of economic regulation need only be a 
foreseeable result of a particular statute; it need not be compelled or even 
necessary to the regulatory scheme.72  The so-called clear articulation 
prong of the test requires a party to point to legislation that has been (or, 
if not yet interpreted, could reasonably be) read by state courts, agencies, 
or municipalities to embody the view that the public interest would be 
served if a regulatory scheme displaced the forces of the free market.  
The existence of a statute meeting this criterion ensures that the state 
legislature at least conceived of the possibility that the authorized 
regulation would have anticompetitive effects. 
Read in isolation, the first prong of this test appears to contradict the 
premise that antitrust immunities are disfavored because it interprets 
intent to displace competition so liberally.  For a private party’s conduct 
to be exempt from antitrust scrutiny, however, it must also be actively 
supervised by governmental officials in a manner sufficient to ensure 
that the state’s view of the public interest—rather than the private 
interests of the regulated parties—is served.73  “Actual state involvement, 
not deference to private [anticompetitive] arrangements under the 
general auspices of state law, is the precondition for [application of the 
doctrine].”74  The active supervision requirement ensures that the challenged 
“anticompetitive acts were truly the product of state regulation.”75 
Under this view, antitrust rules limit only the ability of a private 
 
regulation is quite similar to the rationale for an antitrust immunity from federal 
regulation.”). 
 68. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 69. Id. at 351. 
 70. See S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 57 
(1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 43–44 (1985); Cal. Retail 
Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1980). 
 71. See Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105. 
 72. See S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 471 U.S. at 61; Town of Hallie, 471 
U.S. at 41–46. 
 73. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992); Patrick 
v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988). 
 74. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. at 633. 
 75. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100. 
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business to enter anticompetitive agreements or take actions that tend to 
create or maintain a monopoly.  Antitrust places these limits on private 
conduct not because agreements and monopolies are inherently 
undesirable in all contexts.  Unrestrained competition also can have 
negative public welfare effects.76  Antitrust doctrine holds only that the 
forces of competition must prevail over the private decisions of 
presumptively self-interested business persons because private actors 
will be tempted to use collusion or monopoly power to serve their own 
interests.  But when a public-interested actor makes the decision to 
displace free market forces, antitrust principles are not offended because 
governmental actors may be trusted to choose anticompetitive solutions 
only when they are in the public interest. 
B.  Court and Agency Analysis in the Telecom-Antitrust                         
Cases Rests on These Doctrines 
The following Subsections show how the courts deciding the telecom-
antitrust cases have relied on these two doctrines. 
1.  The Second and Eleventh Circuits Rely on the                                 
Implied Immunity Doctrine 
In Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atlantic Corp. and 
Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., the lower courts 
dismissed the antitrust claims on the ground that antitrust does not 
require a firm, even a monopolist, to help its competitors.77  On appeal, 
the courts correctly recognized that the Sherman Act sometimes does 
impose positive duties on monopolists.78  Because the complaint alleged 
all the elements of a section 2 case, it could not be dismissed unless the 
1996 Act immunized Bell Atlantic from antitrust attack. 
The Second and Eleventh Circuits—in keeping with the arguments in 
 
 76. Congress has implicitly recognized this by creating explicit antitrust 
exemptions, silently acquiescing in judicially created exemptions, and granting broad 
discretion to the courts to shape antitrust duties.  Semeraro, supra note 66, at 236–39. 
 77. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 96 (2d 
Cir. 2002); Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th 
Cir. 2002). 
 78. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 108–09 (holding that allegations 
amounting to violations of the 1996 Act state section 2 claims under the essential 
facilities and monopoly leveraging doctrines); Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth 
Corp., 299 F.3d at 1284–87 (same). 
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Antitrust Division and FCC amicus filings in other cases—followed the 
conflict-centered dicta in the Supreme Court implied immunity cases 
and held that the Telecom Act did not block antitrust scrutiny.79  
Because the Telecom Act’s express purpose is to engender just the sort 
of competition that the antitrust laws are designed to preserve, there is 
obviously no conflict.80  The Second Circuit explained that such a 
conclusion is “unambiguously” established by the Act’s antitrust savings 
clause.81  Neither the courts nor the agencies consider the effect of 
 
 79. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 109; see Covad Communications 
Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d at 1280; see also Brief of Amici Curiae United States 
and the Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 10, Covad 
Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (No. 01-16064-C); Brief for the 
United States and Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellants at 8, Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. (11th 
Cir. filed Jan. 12, 2001) (No. 01-10224-JJ). 
 80. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 109; Covad Communications Co. 
v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d at 1281–82 (supporting conclusion with references to 
legislative history and presidential and FCC statements); Brief of Amici Curiae United 
States and the Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 14–15, Covad 
Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (No. 01-16064-C) (contrasting 
the Telecom Act with a statute that empowers  “a regulatory agency . . . to approve, in 
furtherance of other regulatory goals, anticompetitive conduct that would otherwise 
violate the antitrust laws”); Brief for the United States and Federal Communications 
Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants at 10–12, Intermedia 
Communications (No. 01-10224-JJ). 
 81. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 109.  The 1996 Act actually 
contains two savings clauses: (1) “nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this 
Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the 
antitrust laws,” Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601, Stat. 143 (1996); and (2) “This Act and the 
amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede 
Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such Act or amendments.”  
47 U.S.C. § 152(c)(1) (2000).  The legislative history of the Act also supports this 
understanding by recognizing as an “underlying theme” of the Act that the FCC “should 
be carrying out the policies of the Communications Act, and the DOJ should be carrying 
out the policies of the antitrust laws.”  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 201 (1996).  The 
House Conference Report also confirmed that the Act’s savings clauses “[prevent] 
affected parties from asserting that the [Act] impliedly preempts other laws.”  Id. 
While generally in accord with the Second Circuit’s decision in Trinko, amicus briefs 
filed by the enforcement agencies rely more heavily on the antitrust savings clause to 
support their position that full antitrust analysis is required.  Brief of Amici Curiae 
United States and the Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 10, 
Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (No. 01-16064-C) 
(explaining that the savings clause meant that “conduct that would have violated the 
Sherman Act before passage of the 1996 Act is still prohibited by the Sherman Act, 
whether or not it also violates the 1996 Act”); Brief for the United States v. Federal 
Communications Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants at 8, Intermedia 
Communications (No. 01-10224-JJ) (same).  But as Judge Martin explained in her 
opinion dismissing Covad’s case against Bell Atlantic, the clause merely preserves 
existing antitrust doctrine.  If the scope of antitrust does not reach regulated conduct 
highly supervised by governmental actors, and the 1996 Act meets that definition, then 
violations of the Act’s provisions would not constitute antitrust violations despite the 
savings clause.  Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 131 
(D.D.C. 2002) (“Congress made explicit its intention that the 1996 Act should not in any 
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government oversight.  Instead, the courts declared that the relationship 
between the plaintiffs’ allegations and the Telecom Act was simply 
irrelevant to antitrust analysis.82  “If there is no . . . implicit immunity,” 
the Second Circuit explained, “as long as a set of allegations states an 
antitrust action on its own terms, the fact that it closely resembles an 
action brought under another statute in itself is unproblematic.”83 
2.  The Seventh Circuit and Most Lower Courts Implicitly                           
Rely on Government Oversight 
The following Subsections analyze the much more confusing analysis 
in Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp.84 and the cases that follow it.  These 
courts explicitly reject any reliance on the implied immunity doctrine.  
They instead hold that a violation of a duty imposed by the 1996 Act 
cannot be anticompetitive within the meaning of the Sherman Act.85  
The final Subsections consider two explanations for this result: (1) that 
antitrust does not impose positive duties to assist potential competitors,  
and (2) that conduct actively supervised by governmental actors falls 
outside the scope of antitrust scrutiny.  They conclude that the latter 
analysis provides the best rationale for the results in these cases.  As 
explained in Part IV, however, existing antitrust-regulatory accommodation 
doctrine is inadequate where the regulation seeks to enhance competition. 
 
way alter the application or scope of existing antitrust law.”); cf. Square D Co. v. 
Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 418, 419 & n.23, 420 & n.27 (1986) 
(recognizing that the antitrust savings clause in the Reed-Bulwinkle Act and the Motor 
Carrier Act preserved antitrust limitations of the filed rate doctrine). 
 82. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 109 (holding that “there is no 
requirement that an allegation that otherwise states an antitrust claim must not rely on 
allegations that might also state a claim under another statute”); see also id. at 111 
(holding that “controlling case law does not support the theory that specific legislation 
meant to encourage competition necessarily takes precedence over the general antitrust 
laws.”); Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d at 1282 (“[W]e cannot 
agree with Goldwasser to the extent that it is read to say that a Sherman Act antitrust 
claim cannot be brought as a matter of law on the basis of an allegation of anti-competitive 
conduct that happens to be ‘intertwined’ with obligations established by the 1996 Act.”). 
 83. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 109; see also Covad Communications 
Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d at 1282–83. 
 84. 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000), aff’g on other grounds, No. 97-C-6788, 1998 
WL 60878 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 4, 1998). 
 85. See infra Part III.B.2.a. 
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a.  The Goldwasser Decision and Its Progeny 
In Goldwasser, the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of an antitrust 
claim by local telephone service customers against Ameritech.86  On its 
face, the complaint alleged the elements necessary to prove that 
Ameritech violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.87  Local telephone 
service undoubtedly forms a relevant antitrust market, and Ameritech 
certainly had monopoly power in that market by virtue of its 
overwhelming market share and the high barriers to entry into local 
telephone service.  The only real question was whether the alleged 
conduct constituted anticompetitive predatory conduct or procompetitive 
conduct justified by a legitimate business justification. 
The court never engaged in the analysis necessary to answer that 
question.88  Judge Wood’s opinion did not evaluate whether the conduct 
substantially contributed to maintaining Ameritech’s dominant position, 
 
 86. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 392, 402. 
 87. In a monopolization case, the court must define the relevant market, determine 
whether the defendant has monopoly power in that market, and if so, evaluate whether 
the challenged conduct is predatory or exclusionary—whether its effect was to exclude 
or limit competition in a way that did not benefit consumers.  For an exemplary recent 
example of this antitrust analysis, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,  
50–78 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  In Goldwasser, no one disputed that Ameritech had market 
power in local telephone service, and the complaint alleged that its conduct violating the 
Act was predatory, i.e. without a procompetitive purpose and beneficial to the actor only 
to the extent that it lessened competition on the merits. 
 88. Some courts have added, in dicta, that antitrust remedies would threaten the 
elaborate structure of negotiations and regulatory approval created by the 1996 Act.  As 
the Seventh Circuit explained in Goldwasser: “[T]he procedures established under the 
1996 Act for achieving competitive markets are [not] compatible with the procedures 
that would be used to accomplish the same result under the antitrust laws.”  Goldwasser, 
222 F.3d at 401.  “The elaborate system of negotiated agreements and enforcement 
established by the 1996 Act could be brushed aside by any unsatisfied party with the 
simple act of filing an antitrust action.”  Id.; see also Supra Telecomms. & Info. Sys., 
Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., No. 99-1706-CIV-SEITZ, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23816, at *12 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2001) (same); Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. 
Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 133 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting a “fundamental incompatibility 
between the remedial schemes established by the antitrust laws and the 1996 Act”). 
The agencies’ amicus filings explain why the remedy concern is overstated.  “[A]ny 
antitrust relief,” they point out, “should take account of regulatory policy and decisions 
in regulatory proceedings . . . .  The need to harmonize enforcement of complementary 
federal statutes, however, is not a proper basis for dismissing a complaint—especially 
one seeking only damages—at the pleading state.”  Brief of Amici Curiae United States 
and the Federal Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 15, Covad 
Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-16064-
C).  In another amicus brief, the Department agreed “that courts should attempt to avoid 
conflict with regulatory policy in fashioning antitrust injunctions.  The speculative 
possibility that an injunction could ultimately be entered in this case, however, scarcely 
justifies dismissing a complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief at the pleadings 
stage.”  Brief for the United States and Federal Communications Commission as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Appellants at 19, Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth 
Telecomms., Inc. (11th Cir. filed Jan. 12, 2001) (No. 01-10224-JJ). 
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nor did it look to whether the company had legitimate business reasons 
for its conduct.  That failure would have been understandable if the court 
had held that the 1996 Act immunized Ameritech from antitrust liability.  
But the court forswore any reliance on the implied immunity doctrine.89 
Instead, the court declared, without market-specific analysis, that 
violations of a regulatory statute are not predatory acts under the antitrust 
laws.90  The court concluded that duties imposed by the 1996 Act “are 
precisely the kinds of affirmative duties to help one’s competitors 
that . . . do not exist under the unadorned antitrust laws.”91  Because 
those duties “go well beyond anything the antitrust laws would mandate 
on their own,” the complaint amounted to an attack on a monopolist for 
failing to help its competitors and thereby lower prices for consumers.92  
Because “the antitrust laws do not impose that kind of affirmative duty, 
even on monopolists,” the complaint failed to state a claim.93 
The plaintiffs countered, and the court did not dispute, that the antitrust 
laws sometimes do impose positive duties on monopolists to cooperate with 
competitors.  But because all of the allegations were “inextricably linked to 
the claims under the 1996 Act,”94 the court held that the more specific 
provisions of the 1996 Act “must take precedence.”95 
Despite its broad language, Goldwasser could be read to establish no 
more than a rule of careful pleading—that merely alleging a violation of 
a regulatory statute does not suffice to state an antitrust claim.  Instead, a 
plaintiff must allege with more particularity how such a violation 
affected competition in the relevant market.96  In most telecom-antitrust 
 
 89. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 401 (“Our principal holding is thus not that the 1996 Act 
confers implied immunity on behavior that would otherwise violate the antitrust law[s].”). 
 90. See id. at 399–400. 
 91. Id. at 400. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 401. 
 95. Id.; see also Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal 
Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 18, Covad Communications Co. v. 
BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-16064-C). 
The meaning of this passage is unclear, particularly in view of the Seventh 
Circuit’s express disclaimer of any holding “that the 1996 Act confers implied 
immunity on behavior that would otherwise violate the antitrust law,” and its 
acknowledgment that “[s]uch a conclusion would be troublesome at best given 
the antitrust savings clause in the statute.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 401). 
 96. Philip J. Weiser, Goldwasser, The Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust 
Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
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cases following Goldwasser, however, the district courts have interpreted 
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion broadly to preclude any antitrust claim 
relating to a violation of the 1996 Act irrespective of the specificity of 
the pleading.97  For example, Judge Seitz, in Supra Telecommunications 
& Information Systems, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 
declared that claims of this sort “extend far beyond the purview of [the] 
antitrust laws which generally do not require a monopolist to ‘cooperate 
with competitors.’”98  Similarly, in Covad’s case against Bell Atlantic, 
Judge Kessler wrote that the Act “was designed by Congress to spur 
competition in local telephone markets in ways that the antitrust laws did 
not require.”99  As a result, an ILEC’s “failure to comply with [the duties 
imposed by the 1996 Act] . . . does not constitute ‘exclusionary’ conduct 
as a matter of law.”100  Following this reasoning, these courts have 
dismissed all claims bearing any connection to the 1996 Act without 
evaluating the conduct under the “rule of reason.”101 
 
 97. For example, in Cavalier, the plaintiff took great care to allege its antitrust 
claims in the traditional way without reference to the 1996 Act.  Cavalier Tel., L.L.C. v. 
Verizon Va. Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611–12 (E.D. Va. 2002).  In dismissing the 
claims, the court rejected the notion that Goldwasser could be limited to a pleading 
requirement.  Id. at 613 (“That Cavalier’s Complaint did not characterize its allegations 
as violations of the 1996 Act is beside the point.  Such a shallow interpretation of the 
relationship between the 1996 Act and antitrust law would relegate the matter to a 
mindless word game played out at the pleading stage . . . .”).  
 98. Supra Telecomms. & Info. Sys., Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., No. 99-
1706-CIV-SEITZ, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23816, at *11 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2001).  “No 
court has yet held that antitrust laws now include the affirmative duties created by the 
TCA and this Court shall decline to do so as well.”  Id. at *14; see also Cavalier Tel., 
208 F. Supp. 2d at 613 (explaining that the “specific obligations” imposed by the 1996 
Act “extend far beyond the general admonitions against monopolization and anti-
competitive behavior expressed by federal antitrust law”); Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 738, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002). 
The affirmative duties imposed by the Telecommunications Act are not 
coterminous with the duty of a monopolist to refrain from exclusionary 
practices.  Moreover, the mere fact that a monopolist has violated another 
statute does not transform such offense into a violation of the antitrust laws.  
Thus, plaintiff has failed to allege any “willful acquisition or maintenance” of 
monopoly power by Bell Atlantic. 
Id. (citations omitted); Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., No. 
00-CIV-1910, slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2001) (“Because [plaintiffs have] failed to 
allege any anticompetitive conduct on the part of Bell Atlantic, its Sherman Act claim 
must be dismissed.”)), rev’d, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002); MGC Communications, Inc. v. 
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1351–52 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (quoting 
extensively from Goldwasser and applying its reasoning). 
 99. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 
(D.D.C. 2002). 
 100. Id. 
 101. For example, courts have dismissed claims that “raise[d] a duty or obligation 
created and imposed by the 1996 Act,” were “intertwined with,” “related to,” “included 
under,” “implicated by,” “‘inextricably linked’ to,” or “essentially a reincarnation of” a 
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b.  Interpreting Goldwasser and Its Progeny 
This Subsection considers two possible explanations for the results in 
the Goldwasser line of cases: (1) that violations of the positive duties 
under the Act could not be anticompetitive in any context, and (2) that 
active government oversight renders conduct within the market regulated 
by the 1996 Act beyond the scope of the antitrust laws.  This Subsection 
concludes that while the first explanation is unsupportable, the second 
provides the best, though still inadequate, justification for the holdings. 
i.  The Fully Contextual Nature of Antitrust Analysis 
Opinions in the telecom-antitrust cases appear to hold that conduct 
violating the antitrust laws has certain metes and bounds irrespective of 
competitive conditions.  These lines of demarcation separate collusive 
conduct and unilateral acts that hinder a competitor’s ability to compete 
from cooperative behavior that assists competitors.  The 1996 Act’s 
positive duties to cooperate, the courts seem to believe, fall outside the 
purview of the antitrust laws in every imaginable context.102 
Goldwasser surely relied, at least in part, on this line of reasoning.  
The court emphasized that even monopolists must have sufficient 
breathing room to compete, and that “[p]art of competing like everyone 
else is the ability to make decisions about with whom and on what terms 
one will deal.”103  As a result, “even a firm with significant market 
 
duty created by the 1996 Act.  Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal 
Communications Commission as Amici Curiae at 11, Covad Communications Co. v. 
BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-16064-C) (quoting various 
formulations used in Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.); see also Bldg. 
Communications, Inc. v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., No. 97-CV-76336, slip op. at 20–24 
(E.D. Mich. June 21, 2001); Cavalier Tel., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 615 n.3, 616–17 
(dismissing the claim based on an “allegation that Verizon employees contacted 
Cavalier’s existing and potential customers in an attempt to draw business away from 
Cavalier,” an allegation that the court admitted “does not concern a duty imposed by the 
1996 Act”). 
 102. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 131 
(“[T]here is nearly unanimous consensus that the 1996 Act imposes affirmative duties of 
assistance that require far more than the existing antitrust laws now require.”); cf. USM 
Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 513 (7th Cir. 1982) (“There is a difference 
between positive and negative duties, and the antitrust laws, like other legal doctrines 
sounding in tort, have generally been understood to impose only the latter.”).  For cases 
describing the minimum criteria for antitrust liability see Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite 
Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984); Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 103. Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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power” has the freedom to deal with customers and partners of its own 
choosing, unless its “decisions are part of a broader effort to maintain its 
monopoly power.”104 
Many of the lower courts simply follow Goldwasser.  But Judge 
Kessler’s opinion in Covad’s case against Bell Atlantic expanded on 
Judge Wood’s analysis.  She wrote that “conduct that was proscribed 
prior to the 1996 Act remains proscribed after its enactment.  Similarly, 
conduct that did not violate antitrust law prior to the 1996 Act does not 
now violate antitrust law after the Act.”105  This language could be 
interpreted in two ways.  Judge Kessler could be making a contextual 
claim that given the competitive conditions in the local telephone 
market, the challenged acts do not cause competitive concern 
irrespective of the 1996 Act.  But such a claim would require careful 
economic analysis not found in the opinion.  Judge Kessler does cite the 
“nearly unanimous consensus that the 1996 Act imposes affirmative 
duties of assistance that require far more than the existing antitrust laws 
now require.”106  But none of the cited cases engaged in the market 
specific analysis needed to support that holding. 
The utter absence of antitrust analysis suggests a second interpretation 
of Judge Kessler’s language, namely that some conduct, particularly 
conduct involving a refusal to cooperate with a potential competitor, 
may never rise to the level of an antitrust violation.  But such a 
noncontextual reading of the antitrust laws conflicts with a longstanding 
tradition of imposing positive obligations in certain limited contexts 
where defendants have monopoly power.  The traditional starting points 
are United States v. Terminal Railroad Association, where the U.S. 
Supreme Court ordered access on fair and equal terms to a jointly-owned 
bridge across the Mississippi,107 and Associated Press v. United States, 
where the Court required that a cooperative newsgathering agency be 
opened to the competitors of its existing members.108  In Lorain Journal 
Co. v. United States, the Court compelled a newspaper to accept 
advertising from firms that also advertised with a competing radio 
station.109  In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the Court 
required a ski mountain operator to cooperate with a competitor by selling 
 
 104. Id. at 398. 
 105. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 131.  Judge 
Kessler further explained that Covad’s “allegations focus on disputes over the terms for 
obtaining access to Bell Atlantic’s local exchange network—an entitlement that was first 
created by the 1996 Act (not by the antitrust laws).”  Id. at 132. 
 106. Id. at 131. 
 107. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383, 411–12 (1912).
  108. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21 (1945).
  109. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 152–53 (1951).
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tickets that allowed skiers to choose to ski on any mountain.110  And the 
Microsoft case will certainly yield cooperative remedies, most likely in the 
form of a duty to disclose information about updates in Windows, to allow 
competitive software providers to update their own products.111 
These cases demonstrate that antitrust doctrine is contextual.  That is, 
whether particular conduct violates the law depends on the competitive 
conditions within which the conduct is taken.112  Those telecom-antitrust 
courts that do not ignore this line of authority distinguish it on the 
ground that the defendants in those cases were not subjected to a 
regulatory program with as much structure as the program created by the 
Telecom Act.113  They recognize that the U.S. Supreme Court imposed a 
positive duty on a highly regulated electric utility in Otter Tail Power Co. 
 
 110. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 598–99 (1985).
  111. Revised Proposed Final Judgment in United States v. Microsoft (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9500/9505.htm. 
 112. For example, an exclusive dealing arrangement between a new manufacturer 
and a distributor in a market in which many manufacturers and distributors compete is 
virtually certain to be a procompetitive way for the new manufacturer to enter the 
market.  Conversely, exclusive dealing arrangements between a dominant manufacturer 
and the only three effective existing distributors of a particular product causes 
competitive concern if the smaller competing manufacturers do not have meaningful 
alternatives for distributing their products. 
Antitrust doctrine does include certain per se rules that purport to prohibit particular 
types of behavior.  But even these rules apply contextually.  And the courts have been 
extremely reluctant to adopt rules of per se legality.  See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 229–30 (1993) (rejecting a rule of per se 
legality for primary-line price discrimination claims where recoupment is premised on 
oligopoly pricing); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121 (1986) 
(rejecting a rule of per se legality for predatory pricing claims arising from a merger).  
Per se rules against tying and group boycotts explicitly require contextual analysis in the 
rule itself.  See N.W. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 
U.S. 284, 293–98 (1985); Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9–16 (1984).  And 
even the rules against price fixing, market division, and customer allocation, which are 
typically stated more matter-of-factly, require some contextual analysis.  See Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 
(1984); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1979).
  113. See Cavalier Tel., L.L.C. v. Verizon Va. Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 608, 616 n.4 (E.D. Va. 2002) (distinguishing Aspen Skiing on the ground that “Cavalier’s allegations 
concern the manner in which Verizon is meeting its responsibilities under the 1996 
Act”); see also Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 399–400 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that Congress could have imposed “passive restrictions on the ILECs, under 
which they would have been permitted to compete, but they would have been prohibited 
from engaging in affirmatively exclusionary acts like the efforts of the Ski Company in 
Aspen Skiing, or the newspaper company in Lorain Journal,” but instead Congress chose 
a more intrusive regulatory approach).
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v. United States,114 and the MFJ dismantled AT&T’s regulated monopoly 
over telephone service.  But Judge Kessler maintains that those cases did 
not involve regulation as pervasive as that imposed by the 1996 Act over 
the very acts that are alleged to give rise to antitrust liability.115 
This reasoning goes too far.  To be sure, regulation necessarily affects 
antitrust analysis to the extent that it alters the competitive conditions in 
the market.116  For example, in Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 
then-Judge Breyer explained that a price squeeze is much less likely to 
have anticompetitive effects in a market with full price regulation than in 
an unregulated market.117  That conclusion is correct in part because 
recognizing an antitrust price-squeeze claim in a regulated market would 
create a perverse incentive for a regulated entity to increase its price at 
both the wholesale and retail levels whenever it needed to raise price at 
one level.118  Where economic analysis reveals such an anticompetitive 
 
 114. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1973) (requiring 
a regulated, natural monopoly provider of electric power transmission to cooperate with 
a competitor at the distribution level).
  115. The Federal Power Commission did not have the authority to order the wheeling sought in Otter Tail Power and, while the FCC did have the power to order the 
interconnection sought in the MCI and government cases brought against AT&T, the 
initial interconnection decision rested with the utility and “the FCC [had not] supervised 
AT&T’s interconnection practices so closely.”  Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. 
Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 133 & n.21 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting MCI Communications  
Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1103 (7th Cir. 1983)).
  116. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that “where regulatory and antitrust regimes coexist, . . . antitrust analysis 
must sensitively ‘recognize and reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting’ of the 
regulated industry to which it applies”) (citations omitted) (quoting Keith S. Watson & 
Thomas W. Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated “Monopolies”: The Search for 
Substantive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 559, 565 (1977)); MCI Communications 
Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1106 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that “the 
presence of a substantial degree of regulation, although not sufficient to confer antitrust 
immunity, may affect both the shape of ‘monopoly power’ and the precise dimensions of 
the ‘willful acquisition or maintenance’ of that power” (quoting Keith S. Watson & 
Thomas W. Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated “Monopolies”: The Search for 
Substantive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 559, 563 (1977))); id. at 1109–10 (explaining 
that a regulated firm should be able to defend against a predatory act charge by showing 
that it acted in the good faith belief that its actions were required by applicable regulation); 
Phonetele, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 737–38 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
a defendant’s “reasonable basis to conclude that its actions were necessitated by concrete 
factual imperatives recognized as legitimate by the regulatory authority” prevents 
antitrust liability);  IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 240c3 (explaining that 
“antitrust courts can and do consider the particular circumstances of an industry and 
therefore adjust their usual rules to the existence, extent, and nature of regulation”).
  117. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 29.  A price squeeze occurs when a producer  that also competes at a downstream level leaves too little spread between its wholesale 
and retail price, threatening to drive downstream firms from the market.  See United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 437–38 (2d Cir. 1945).
  118. Similarly, a regulated firm would be reluctant to reduce price at one level unless it was prepared to reduce its prices at both.  Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 27.
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effect from recognizing a particular antitrust claim, a court should 
ordinarily dismiss the claim.119 
Nothing approaching that sort of analysis can be found in any of the 
telecom-antitrust cases.  They instead rely on the unsupportable assertion 
that a pervasively regulated firm simply cannot harm competition.  As 
Judge Kessler put it, an ILEC “has no freedom to take any unilateral 
action relating to access to interconnection with the local networks.”120  
Of course, AT&T made essentially the same argument in the early 
1980s.121  It was rejected then because Judge Greene recognized that no 
matter how extensive regulation might be, it can never pervasively 
dictate a firm’s behavior.122  There will always be space within the 
regulatory rules for a business entity to make significant competitive 
decisions that are not dictated by regulators.  Indeed, business entities 
quickly learn to play the regulatory rules to minimize their procompetitive 
impact.123  In the telecom-antitrust cases, the ILECs are charged with 
 
 119. For example, in Town of Concord, then-Judge Breyer was careful to limit the 
scope of his holding to circumstances where the court’s analysis applied most strongly.  
He explained that the court: 
limited [its] holding by stating that “normally” a price squeeze will not 
constitute an exclusionary practice in the context of a fully regulated 
monopoly, thereby leaving cases involving exceptional circumstances for 
another day.  And we have stressed that our reasoning applies with full force 
only when the monopolist who engages in the squeeze is regulated at both 
industry levels. 
Id. at 29. 
 120. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 133.
  121. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1357–58 (D.D.C. 1981).
  122. Id.  For this reason, antitrust law has always had “a substantial role in regulated industries.”  IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 241c.
  123. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 27–28, 40–42 (1987) (explaining how entities subject to a set of rules learn to “walk the line” along 
rules to serve their own interests); see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: 
A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 
32–33 (1991) (stating that “[f]actual predicates will therefore in some cases turn on 
features of the case that do not serve the rule’s justification, and in others fail to 
recognize features of the case whose recognition would serve the rule’s justification”).  
Further, “[t]hese errors are not a function of mistakes that decision-makers may make, 
but instead are generated by decision-makers faithfully and accurately following the 
rules.”  Id. at 49.  “This under- and over-inclusiveness . . . is largely ineliminable, the 
product of entrenchment and not simply of how specific or how general a rule happens to 
be.”  Id. at 50.  “But rules achieve clarity, certainty, and determinateness, at the price of 
including either more or fewer cases in the legal categories defined by the rules than the 
rationale underlying the rule calls for.”  Id. at 50 n.14 (quoting GERALD J. POSTEMA, 
BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 447 (1986)). 
Congress surely foresaw that problem in the local telephone service market and 
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doing exactly that: delaying, discriminating, and engaging in other 
anticompetitive conduct that has not been prevented by—and certainly 
was not required by—the regulatory scheme.124 
ii.  Regulation and Government Supervision 
Although the results in Goldwasser and its progeny would be 
inexplicable in an unregulated market, the opinions in those cases 
emphasize the importance of regulation.  From the perspective of the 
implied immunity doctrine, as traditionally understood, these references 
to regulation appear to be irrelevant.  There is simply no conflict 
between the statutes.  But if one views the opinions through the prism of 
the antitrust state action doctrine, a more coherent approach emerges.  In 
Goldwasser, Judge Wood explained that competitors should rely on the 
“elaborate enforcement structure that Congress created [in the 1996 Act] 
for purposes of managing the transition from the former regulated world 
to the hoped-for competitive markets of the future.”125  Perhaps if those 
mechanisms were wholly ineffectual, antitrust might have some role to 
play.  Because “[q]uestions concerning the duties of the ILECs, the state 
commissions, and competitors have been coming before the courts with 
regularity,” she concluded, “[t]he antitrust laws would add nothing to the 
oversight already available under the 1996 law.”126 
Judge Kessler’s opinion in Covad v. Bell Atlantic also emphasized that 
private conduct cannot be anticompetitive if it is actively supervised by 
public-minded government regulators.  In rejecting Covad’s argument 
that Bell Atlantic had denied it access to an essential facility, Judge 
Kessler maintained that: 
there can be no significant harm to competition or anti-competitive effect as a 
matter of antitrust law, as every relevant facet of Bell Atlantic’s relationship 
with Covad is subject to regulation under the 1996 Act, the rules of the FCC, 
and the affirmative and active supervision of state public utility commissions 
charged with the 1996 Act’s enforcement.127 
 
responded by requiring negotiated agreements between competitors rather than 
proscribing the specific terms on which they had to deal.  Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 104  (2d Cir. 2002) (“Congress sought to 
allow ILECs and their competitors to govern their interconnection relationships directly 
through specific interconnection agreements rather than the broadly outlined duties 
described in [section 251].”). 
 124. As the Second Circuit explained: “While ideally, the regulatory process alone 
would be enough to bring competition to the local phone service markets, it is possible 
that the antitrust laws will be needed to supplement the regulatory scheme . . . .”  Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 305 F.3d at 112 (footnote omitted).
  125. Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 400 (7th Cir. 2000).
  126. Id. at 400–01. 
  127. Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132 
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This is not an argument about conflicting statutory schemes.  It is an 
assertion of substantive antitrust law—that antitrust law does not 
function where regulation rather than marketplace forces govern 
competitive interaction among firms.  This assertion is the antitrust state 
action doctrine: private conduct falls outside the scope of antitrust 
scrutiny because it is the product of public, rather than private, decision. 
By finding that the challenged conduct falls outside the scope of 
antitrust law, these decisions avoid running afoul of the Telecom Act’s 
antitrust savings clause.  As Judge Kessler explained, the savings clause 
merely preserves existing antitrust doctrine.128  But existing doctrine 
includes doctrine that defines limitations on the scope of antitrust.  
Conduct that violated the antitrust laws before the enactment of the 1996 
Act—private business conduct—would continue to violate the antitrust 
laws.  But conduct subject to active oversight by state actors, which did 
not violate the antitrust laws before the 1996 Act, could not become an 
antitrust violation as a result of the Act. 
A likely objection to this interpretation of the Goldwasser line of cases 
is that antitrust state action applies only to state regulation, and the 
Telecom Act is obviously federal law.  As described above, however, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has looked to supervision by governmental actors 
regardless of the source of the regulation.  And, in similar cases 
involving joint federal-state regulation of electric and gas utilities, the 
courts have had no difficulty applying antitrust state action doctrine. 
For example, electric utilities, like telephone companies, have long been 
subjected to a dual system of regulation.  In 1978, Congress passed the 
Public Utility Regulatory Practices Act (PURPA),129 defining a class of 
small scale electric power generators that could reduce the monopoly local 
electricity providers’ reliance on fossil fuel.130  Congress recognized two 
barriers to this sort of entry into electric power generation that were 
remarkably similar to the difficulties faced in the local telephone service 
market.  First, existing regulatory structures made market entry cumbersome 
and expensive.131  Second, the utilities had no incentive to agree to provide 
 
(D.D.C. 2002) (“Bell Atlantic has no freedom to take any unilateral action relating to 
access to interconnection with the local networks.”).
  128. See id. at 130–31.
  129. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1994).
  130. Id. § 796(17)(A)–(18)(B).
  131. TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560, 1564 n.5 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that PURPA “relax[ed] restrictions on entry into the (former 
monopolist’s) service area”).
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backup power to, or to buy excess power from, new entrants because they 
would likely steal the utilities’ largest customers. 
In the electric power industry, Congress sought to overcome these 
obstacles in much the same way that it later would in the Telecom Act.  It 
placed positive duties on the electric utilities to interconnect with the new 
generators for the purpose of buying and selling power,132 directing the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to issue rules and regulations, and 
also directing state public utility commissions to implement those rules.133 
Not surprisingly, electric utilities did not respond as cooperatively as 
the new generators would have liked.  Inevitably, failed projects led to a 
bevy of antitrust suits that amounted to a prequel to the antitrust 
litigation that has followed the 1996 Act.134  Unlike the ILECs, electric 
 
 132. The legislative history of PURPA recognized: 
that two problems impeded the development of nontraditional generating 
facilities: (1) traditional electricity utilities were reluctant to purchase power 
from, and to sell power to, the nontraditional facilities, and (2) the regulation 
of these alternative energy sources by state and federal utility authorities 
imposed financial burdens upon the nontraditional facilities and thus 
discouraged their development. 
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750–51 (1982) (footnotes 
omitted); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (directing FERC to prescribe implementing rules).
  133. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)–(f); Conn. Light and Power Co., 70 F.E.R.C. 61,012 (1995).  State utility commissions were granted “latitude in determining the manner in 
which the regulations are to be implemented.  Thus, a state commission may comply 
with the statutory requirements by issuing regulations, by resolving disputes on a case-
by-case basis, or by taking any other action reasonably designed to give effect to 
FERC’s rules.”  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. at 751.  
Should a state commission fail to implement FERC’s rules, however, PURPA authorizes 
FERC to enforce the statute’s requirements in federal court.  16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(h).
  134. Representative claims included allegations that utilities: (1) Refused to buy power on the terms required by an interconnection agreement.  See 
TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d at 1567 (alleging that the utility “paid cogenerators too 
little for their excess power”); Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light 
Co., 113 F.3d 405, 412 (3d Cir. 1997) (alleging that utility disingenuously invoked 
system emergency exception to power purchase contract in order to avoid 
purchases); Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., No. 97-CV-
10366-BC, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7251, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 1999) (alleging 
a utility’s refusal “to enter into a power purchase agreement, and [to provide] 
meaningful access to interconnect to [the utility’s] transmission systems”); Destec 
Energy, Inc. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 433, 437 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (alleging that 
utility refused to enter power purchase contract without “transport-or-pay” provision). 
(2) Cut their own rates to particular customers to dissuade such customers from 
building competitive power generators.  See TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d at 1567 
(alleging that the utility “offered lower rates to customers considering 
cogeneration”); Indeck Energy Servs, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7251, at *5–6 (alleging 
that the utility offered lower rates conditioned on exclusive dealing with the utility); 
United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172, 173 (W.D.N.Y. 
1998) (alleging that the utility entered “a contract with the University of 
Rochester . . . whereby [the utility] promised to provide electricity . . . at reduced 
rates in return for, inter alia, the University’s promise not to compete”). 
(3) Adopted other practices designed to discourage competition.  See TEC Cogeneration, 
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utilities focused squarely on the antitrust state action doctrine.135  And 
while they met with mixed success, no court held the doctrine 
inapplicable because PURPA was a federal statute.136 
IV.  SIX DEGREES OF CONNECTION BETWEEN COMPETITION- 
ENHANCING, INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC REGULATORY                                   
STATUTES AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
The courts have reached divergent results in the telecom-antitrust 
cases because they have effectively employed two different modes of 
legal analysis.  This Part explains the courts’ confusion about which 
doctrine to apply in the telecom-antitrust cases by showing that neither 
doctrine is adequate.  Instead of the “yes or no” approach to antitrust 
enforcement that is appropriate where regulation serves other public 
policy goals, a more nuanced analysis is required when Congress itself 
makes competition policy.  A court must first consider how antitrust 
enforcement would impact the implementation of the competition-
enhancing regulatory program.  Then, if antitrust would not interfere, a 
court must proceed to consider how the existence of regulatory duties 
should affect antitrust analysis.  In answering these questions, a court 
will be called upon to choose one of six degrees of connection between 
antitrust law and a competition-enhancing, industry-specific regulation. 
 
76 F.3d at 1567 (alleging that the utility “proposed higher rates for backup power sold 
to cogenerators” and interfered with interconnection by imposing “unreasonable terms 
in the interconnection agreement”); Indeck Energy Servs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7251, at *6 (alleging the utility’s refusal “to negotiate in good faith a standby power 
agreement”); Rosemount Cogeneration Joint Venture v. N. States Power Co., No. 4-
90-279, 1991 WL 13729, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 18, 1991) (alleging that the utility 
prevented competitive facility from being constructed by “withdr[awing] its support 
from the project . . . and . . . obtruct[ing] plaintiffs’ access to municipal solid waste 
which was a possible fuel source for the facility”). 
  135. See TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d at 1567–70 (refusing to scrutinize utility conduct under antitrust laws); Indeck Energy Servs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7251, at *7–11; 
Rochester Gas and Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d at 175; Destec Energy, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 444–
58; Rosemount Cogeneration Joint Venture, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1504, at *10–12.
  136. For cases rejecting the antitrust state action defense see Rochester Gas and 
Electric Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d at 175–76; Rosemount Cogeneration Joint Venture, 1991 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1504, at *10–12. 
For cases upholding the antitrust state action defense see TEC Cogeneration, 76 F.3d 
at 1570; Indeck Energy Servs., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7251, at *20–21; N. Star Steel 
Tex., Inc. v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 557, 565–67 (S.D. Tex. 1998); 
Destec Energy, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 458. 
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A.  Distinguishing Existing Doctrine 
Whenever courts consider a conflict between antitrust and another 
regulatory scheme, their task is to accommodate both laws in a way that 
best advances the purposes of each.  Existing doctrine was developed to 
address potential conflicts between antitrust and regulatory programs 
that serve a public policy goal other than competition.  For example, 
PURPA was enacted to lessen reliance on fossil fuel, a public policy 
goal not necessarily consistent with enhancing competition.  In that 
context, both antitrust law and industry-specific regulation may coexist 
without compromising the goals of either.  As a result, implied 
immunities are appropriately disfavored.  The laws’ purposes are best 
served if both apply fully. 
Where governmental actors actively supervise business conduct with a 
noncompetition-enhancing regulatory program, courts refuse to scrutinize 
the conduct under the antitrust laws.  Often, competitive policy can 
coexist with the alternative public policy goal.  But regulators are 
considered to be more capable of balancing competing goals than the 
courts.  In these cases, the antitrust state action doctrine assumes that the 
legislature incorporated into its regulatory framework whatever 
consideration of competitive policy it deemed appropriate and assigned 
that task to regulators.  So long as the governmental oversight is 
sufficiently active, court enforced antitrust duties would interfere or 
conflict with the agency enforced regulatory duties.  Indeed, this is the 
sort of conflict that the U.S. Supreme Court likely had in mind in the 
implied immunity cases. 
In theory, courts could also balance competition and other public policy 
goals.  In practice, however, courts limit their inquiries to competition-based 
arguments.137  Regulators are better situated to take account of noncompetition 
goals and balance them against competitive considerations.  Where 
regulators have no duty to consider competition on an ongoing basis, 
however, their level of supervision may not be sufficiently active to 
remove the conduct from the scope of antitrust, and the courts will 
scrutinize the conduct under the antitrust laws as if the regulation did not 
exist.138  The Court’s decisions in the securities regulation cases provide 
 
 137. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690–92 
(1978).  “[T]he statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question [of] whether 
competition is good or bad.”  Id. at 695. 
 138. In some cases, the Court has applied the antitrust laws despite the legislature’s 
vesting authority in a regulatory body to consider competitive factors.  In these cases, the 
Court appears to have been concerned that Congress did not grant the regulatory body 
sufficient authority to actively supervise the conduct in question.  For example, in United 
States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the Court stressed that authority to take 
competition into account in reviewing a merger was insufficient to supplant the antitrust 
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examples.  In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, there was no active 
governmental supervision of the challenged conduct, and the Court held 
antitrust scrutiny to be appropriate.139  In Gordon v. New York Stock 
Exchange, Inc., the Court trusted government regulators to balance the 
goals of securities regulation and antitrust.140  It was not that competition 
did not have a role to play in the securities industry.  It simply had to be 
applied with due regard for other goals.  While “the sole aim of antitrust 
legislation is to protect competition,” the Court explained, “the SEC 
must consider, in addition, the economic health of the investors, the 
exchanges, and the securities industry.”141  Where competing public 
policy goals exist and governmental actors supervise private 
competitors, imposing the full panoply of antitrust duties would disrupt 
the regulatory structure and potentially interfere with the pursuit of 
either goal.  As Justice Blackmun explained in Gordon: 
Given the expertise of the SEC, the confidence the Congress has placed in the 
agency, and the active roles the SEC and the Congress have taken, permitting 
courts throughout the country to conduct their own antitrust proceedings would 
conflict with the regulatory scheme authorized by Congress rather than 
supplement that scheme.142 
B.  Developing Accommodation Doctrine for                                 
Competition-Enhancing Regulation 
Existing doctrine is inadequate to deal with competition-enhancing 
regulation.  On the one hand, it is not enough to ask whether there is a 
conflict in policies.  When regulation serves competitive ends, the goals 
obviously do not conflict.  But a regulatory program might nonetheless 
be compromised by the duties imposed by the general antitrust laws.  On 
the other hand, when regulation serves competitive ends, a court cannot 
 
laws where the reviewing agency did not have broad, continuing authority to supervise 
competitive factors.  United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350–51 (1963) 
(stressing the limited duty to consider competition in reviewing merger and absence of 
continuing regulatory oversight of competitive factors); see California v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 369 U.S. 482, 486 (1962) (same).
  139. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975).
  142. Id. at 689–90; see United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 735 (1975) (“[M]aintenance of an antitrust action for activities so directly related to 
the SEC’s responsibilities poses a substantial danger that appellees would be subjected to 
duplicative and inconsistent standards.  This is hardly a result that Congress would have 
mandated.”).
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assume that even a highly supervised regulatory program should 
displace antitrust enforcement.  While regulators may well be better 
positioned than courts to balance competition and noncompetition 
oriented public policy goals, where the only goal is enhanced 
competition, courts are at least equally capable. 
In developing doctrine for competition-enhancing regulation, a court 
must begin by recognizing that antitrust duties might interfere with 
regulatory duties even where there is little direct governmental 
oversight.  Just because regulation and antitrust seek the same goal does 
not mean that both can be consistently applied.  But there is also no a 
priori reason to assume that both statutes cannot be consistently applied.  
All regulation is not of a piece.  Inevitably, regulatory programs will 
differ in the requirements imposed and the means of implementation.  A 
court must be sensitive to these differences and the effect that antitrust 
may have on them. 
Judge Wood’s Goldwasser opinion illustrates the challenge by ignoring 
it.  She concludes that it would be “illogical . . . to equate a failure to 
comply with the 1996 Act with a failure to comply with the antitrust 
laws.”143  Recognizing that “there are countless laws that a firm with 
market power might violate that have little or nothing to do with its 
position in the market,” she contended that a violation of a regulatory 
duty cannot “support an antitrust claim.”144 
While that is true with respect to regulatory statutes that in fact have 
“little or nothing to do” with competition, when the purpose of industry-
specific regulation is to enhance competition, a violation of that statute 
has everything to do with the firm’s competitive position.  There may be 
reasons not to layer antitrust duties atop regulatory duties, but logic has 
nothing to do with them.  A court must look carefully at the requirements 
imposed by the statute and the means used to implement it. 
This inquiry should be approached in two stages.  First, a court should 
ask how imposing traditional antitrust duties on regulated firms would 
affect the regulatory program.  If antitrust enforcement would undermine 
the ability of the regulators to spur the competition envisioned by the 
legislature in enacting the industry-specific regulation, then courts should 
not scrutinize conduct under the antitrust laws.  Second, if antitrust 
enforcement would not disrupt the regulatory program, then a court 
should consider how the regulatory statute might affect antitrust analysis. 
 
 143. Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 400 (7th Cir. 2000).
  144. Id. (citing the following situations as examples: “an agricultural firm might fail to comply with safety or cleanliness standards applicable to food processing; a computer 
processor firm might violate employment discrimination laws; a pharmaceutical firm 
might run afoul of the Food and Drug Administration’s rules for approval of new 
drugs”).
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1.  Whether Antitrust Enforcement Would Interfere with a 
Procompetitive Regulatory Program 
This Subsection clarifies the first step in the analysis by preempting 
possible confusion about what is not involved.  It then articulates a test 
for determining whether antitrust enforcement can coexist with a 
competition-enhancing regulatory program. 
a.  Focusing on How Imposing Antitrust Duties Would                           
Affect Regulatory Duties 
In approaching the question of how antitrust enforcement might 
undermine the procompetitive goals of an industry-specific statute, it is 
important to focus on what is not at issue.  First, the necessary inquiry is 
much different from that undertaken with respect to the antitrust state 
action doctrine.  That doctrine focuses on legislative displacement of 
competition and active supervision to ensure that the anticompetitive 
conduct is in fact serving the noncompetitive regulatory goal.  Where 
regulation seeks to enhance competition, asking whether the legislature 
sought to displace competition and whether regulators supervise 
anticompetitive conduct are nonsensical questions.  Instead, a court should 
focus on whether the legislation, along with accompanying regulations, 
channel competitive behavior such that antitrust enforcement might 
prove disruptive. 
Supervision will still be relevant, but in a different way.  In prior 
cases, the issue was whether governmental actors were driving the 
policy decisions.  If they were, then the conduct was deemed to be 
outside the scope of antitrust.145  Where regulation seeks to enhance 
competition, the level of supervision is not as important as the structure 
of the regulation.  Antitrust enforcement might serve positively to 
augment even very actively supervised conduct, because both regulators 
and courts would be advancing the same goal.  Alternatively, antitrust 
might disrupt a program with relatively little government supervision.  
For example, a regulatory statute might require certain competitors to set 
jointly a percentage mark-up over wholesale prices in order to spur 
competition from resellers of the product in question.  Allowing antitrust 
attack on the joint conduct would undermine the regulation irrespective 
of the level of government supervision over the prices set. 
 
 145. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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Second, the focus must be on substantive antitrust duties, not remedies.  
Injunctive antitrust remedies could disrupt virtually any regulatory program 
because, in theory, judges could order parties to alter anticompetitive 
practices in ways that differ from the methods employed by the 
regulation.  Because judges have discretion in imposing injunctive relief, 
however, they are also capable of tailoring that relief so as to minimize 
disruption.146  The appropriate question is not whether antitrust remedies 
could disrupt a regulatory program, but rather whether layering antitrust 
duties on top of the regulatory duties would disrupt the program.  Would 
competitors in the industry be hindered in their ability to fulfill their 
regulatory obligations if they were also required to meet the antitrust 
standards of conduct ordinarily required of law abiding companies? 
b.  Rejecting Antitrust in Favor of Competition-Enhancing Regulation 
Where antitrust would pervasively interfere with a regulatory program, 
competitors in the industry should be free of antitrust duties.  This complete 
exemption could be appropriate in instances where the legislature sought to 
structure the industry in a more orderly way than free competition would 
allow.  Competition can be chaotic.  Long range planning in a competitive 
market is uncertain.  Where the legislature indicates that certainty is essential 
to enable new competitors to enter the market, any antitrust enforcement 
may interfere with the regulatory program.147  Alternatively, and more likely, 
only certain regulatory duties will be compromised by antitrust enforcement.  
In that case, only a competitor’s conduct that falls within those particular 
regulatory duties would be exempted from the antitrust laws. 
The first degree of antitrust-regulatory connection thus calls for no 
connection at all.  Regulation trumps antitrust entirely.  The next Subsection 
addresses the remaining five degrees in which antitrust continues to apply, 
and the relevant question is what effect, if any, the regulatory statute has on 
antitrust analysis. 
 
 146. See Brief of Amici Curiae United States and the Federal Communications 
Commission as Amici Curiae at 15, Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 
F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-16064-C); Brief for the United States and Federal 
Communications Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants at 12–13, 
Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. (11th Cir. filed Jan. 12,  
2001) (No. 01-10224-JJ).  For an excellent discussion of the ways that courts should take 
regulation into account in imposing antitrust remedies see Weiser, supra note 96.
  147. Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) (“An antitrust rule that seeks to promote competition but nonetheless interferes with regulatory 
controls could undercut the very objectives the antitrust laws are designed to serve.”); IA 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 242b (explaining that “where the regulatory 
regime controls such things as pricing, entry by new firms, joint market behavior, 
mergers, or possible exclusionary practices by dominant firms, then an antitrust 
immunity may be essential if regulatory goals are not to be frustrated”).
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2.  How Regulation Affects Antitrust 
If antitrust and the regulatory program can exist side by side without 
interfering with regulatory duties, courts should go on to consider how 
the regulatory program might affect antitrust analysis.  Under existing 
doctrine, if antitrust continues to apply, a court must generally apply it as 
if the regulation did not exist.  Since courts are poorly equipped to 
balance public policy goals, the specifics of the regulation play no role 
in their antitrust analysis.  But the picture changes when the goal of the 
regulation is to enhance consumer welfare. 
Competition-enhancing regulation will assuredly involve explicit 
legislative decisions about the type of conduct necessary to foster a 
competitive environment in that industry.  While there are situations 
where those duties should appropriately be ignored in applying antitrust 
law, in others the legislature’s regulatory decisions will be of critical 
importance to courts in defining antitrust obligations. 
Antitrust analysis is an inexact science, and that uncertainty 
necessarily affects what courts do.  There are often no objective facts to 
which courts may turn to determine whether a particular practice 
enhances competition, harms competition, or is competitively neutral.148  
Because of its uncertainty, leading judges and commentators have 
sought to put off or eliminate this inquiry altogether.149  The courts have 
rejected that approach and have instead relied on burdens and 
presumptions as a proxy for proof of actual anticompetitive effects.  A 
 
 148. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp explain that “the legality of a challenged 
practice under the antitrust laws will often depend on a court’s judgment about the 
degree of social harm that might result from the challenged practice, the social benefits 
that might be obtained through that practice, and the availability of significantly less 
restrictive alternatives.”  IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 240c3.
  149. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
[T]hough it is sometimes said that, in the case of restraints like these, it is 
necessary to weigh procompetitive effects against anticompetitive effects, we 
do not think that a useable formula if it implies an ability to quantify the two 
effects and compare the values found. . . .  Weighing effects in any direct sense 
will usually be beyond judicial capabilities but predictions about effects may 
be reflected in rules about allowable size. . . .  Antitrust adjudication has always 
proceeded through inferences about market power drawn from market shares. 
Id. at 229 n.11.  See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 17–39 (1984) (proposing filters to permit antitrust cases to be dismissed without 
reaching the competitive harm question); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and 
Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981) (proposing that low pricing campaigns be 
treated as legal per se because of the difficulty of resolving the competitive harm question). 
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plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant has a high market 
share and that barriers to market entry exist.  If a plaintiff overcomes that 
burden, it encounters a second burden to prove that the defendant’s 
specific conduct is predatory or exclusionary.  This sort of conduct is 
defined as actions or omissions “other than competition on the merits . . . 
that reasonably [appear] capable of making a significant contribution to 
creating or maintaining monopoly power.”150  Finally, if the defendant 
responds with procompetitive justifications for the challenged conduct, 
the plaintiff must show that the procompetitive benefits could be achieved 
through less restrictive means or that, on balance, the defendant’s 
conduct is anticompetitive. 
In applying these burdens and presumptions, courts must wrestle with 
the concern that procompetitive behavior will be discouraged if it is too 
easy to maintain a plausible antitrust case.151  If the measure of cost in 
predatory pricing cases were too high, for example, firms would be 
discouraged from making procompetitive price cuts in order to guard 
against antitrust litigation, if not liability.  This concern leaves courts 
 
 150. Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 21 (quoting 3 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD 
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 626 (1978)); see Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (defining predatory or exclusionary conduct as 
conduct that tends to “exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency” (quoting 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 138 
(1978))); III PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 650a (1996) (“In order to 
satisfy any conduct component of the monopolizing offense, the conduct in question 
must be capable of making a significant contribution to the creation, maintenance, or 
expansion of monopoly power.”).
  151. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (explaining that “we must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a 
search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging 
legitimate price competition”); see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (referring to the “intolerable risks of chilling 
legitimate price cutting”); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 
775 (1984) (explaining that “[s]ubjecting a single firm’s every action to judicial scrutiny 
for reasonableness would threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the 
antitrust laws seek to promote”).  In Goldwasser, the court explained that: 
It is not enough that a single firm appears to “restrain trade” unreasonably, for 
even a vigorous competitor may leave that impression.  For instance, an 
efficient firm may capture unsatisfied customers from an inefficient rival, 
whose own ability to compete may suffer as a result.  This is the rule of the 
marketplace and is precisely the sort of competition that promotes the 
consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster.  In part because it is 
sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct with long-
run anticompetitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of 
single firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization.  Judging 
unilateral conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will 
dampen the competitive zeal of a single aggressive competitor. 
Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Copperweld 
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767–68 (1984)). 
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appropriately cautious about finding particularly unilateral conduct to be 
predatory. 
But this caution about section 2 cases is seriously undermined where 
the legislature concludes that cooperation is a competitive necessity.  
Walling off the area of prosecution dramatically reduces the concern 
with false positive errors.152  Not all firms would need to worry, only 
those in the regulated industry, and the legislature obviously wanted 
those firms to worry about conduct of this sort. 
The task for a court at this stage is to determine how much the 
regulatory proscription should influence antitrust analysis by eliminating 
one or more of the three burdens—market power, likely anticompetitive 
effect, and rebuttal of procompetitive justifications—that are ordinarily 
placed on an antitrust plaintiff.153  This Subsection describes five 
additional degrees of connection between a regulatory statute and the 
antitrust laws.  The regulatory statute might: 
(1) have no impact whatsoever on the application of the antitrust laws 
to the industry, 
(2) create a presumption that a violation of the regulatory statute has 
anticompetitive effects if the plaintiff proves that the defendant has 
market power in a relevant market and the defendant has inadequate 
procompetitive justifications for the act, 
(3) create a presumption that a violation of the regulatory statute has 
anticompetitive effects even absent proof of market power if the 
 
 152. Cf. Steven Semeraro, Note, Distinguishing International from Domestic 
Predation: A New Approach to Predatory Dumping, 23 STAN. J. INT’L L. 621, 640, 644–45 
(1987) (demonstrating that aggressive enforcement of predatory pricing cases in the 
international arena will not deter aggressive price competition generally because regulatory 
antidumping mechanisms and the clear distinction between international and domestic 
conduct effectively limits the firms exposed to antitrust liability). 
 153. That courts must temper antitrust analysis to account for noncompetition-enhancing 
regulation is well accepted.  IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ¶ 240c3 (explaining 
that “the existence of a special regulatory statute may insulate the court from its usual 
assumptions about industrial behavior and the social good and even render a per se rule 
inapplicable”).  The approach suggested here applies the same reasoning—that the flexible 
antitrust laws must adapt to the specifics of an industry—to expand antitrust in light of 
competition enhancing regulation.  While less often discussed, this possibility is not entirely 
new to the literature.  Id. ¶ 240d. 
[T]he presence of regulation in some instances limits the antitrust role, and in 
some instances simply changes it or even enlarges it.  The impact depends on 
the nature of the regulatory regime, the nature of the antitrust claim, and the 
degree of supervision given by the agency to the challenged conduct. 
Id.
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defendant has inadequate procompetitive justifications for the act, 
(4) create a presumption that a violation of the regulatory statute is 
per se illegal if the plaintiff proves that the defendant has market 
power in a relevant market, or 
(5) create a presumption that a violation of the regulatory statute 
should be treated as a per se antitrust violation regardless of proof 
of market power or potential procompetitive justifications. 
A court’s choice among these will turn on the regulatory methods used 
and the findings underlying them.  To pinpoint just how influential the 
regulation should be, a court must consider the competitive conclusions 
evinced by the legislation.  A marketplace duty intended to enhance 
competition necessarily suggests a finding that the breach of that duty is 
potentially anticompetitive.  Whether the legislature would find that     
the conduct is anticompetitive absent market power or in spite of 
procompetitive justifications requires a harder look. 
a.  The Neutrality Position 
Regulation should not influence antitrust analysis where the 
competition-enhancing regulatory duty does not directly influence 
marketplace behavior.  For example, regulation that creates an obligation 
to file reports on market conditions with a government agency would 
bear little relation to marketplace competition.  Duties of that sort have 
no bearing whatsoever on the application of the antitrust laws, and those 
laws should thus apply as if the regulatory statute did not exist. 
Where a legislature seeks to enhance competition by influencing 
marketplace behavior, however, its requirements will likely have some 
relevance to antitrust analysis, and this degree of separation will be 
inappropriate. 
b.  Treating Regulatory Violations as Predatory Acts Where                   
Market Power Is Shown and the Defendant Has                               
Inadequate Procompetitive Justifications 
A legislature’s decision to require certain conduct in order to facilitate 
greater competition would, by definition, equate to a finding that a 
defendant’s failure to engage in the required conduct may have some 
anticompetitive effect.  Given that competitive effects are difficult to 
measure, courts should defer to this legislative finding.  That conduct 
may lessen competition, however, does not mean that it actually does.  
Generally, a firm without market power is incapable of significantly 
reducing consumer welfare because consumers have other options.  And 
even firms with market power may show that anticompetitive conduct 
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simultaneously promotes competition to such an extent that, on balance, 
the conduct would not violate the antitrust laws.  Where the legislature’s 
findings are unclear, the plaintiff should be required to rebut a 
defendant’s procompetitive justifications. 
This degree of separation differs from the neutrality position only in 
that a plaintiff that establishes the defendant’s market power in the 
relevant market need not also demonstrate that the allegedly predatory 
conduct is likely to have a substantial anticompetitive effect.154  The 
plaintiff would also retain the burden of responding to any procompetitive 
justification proffered by the defendant.  Some regulatory statutes may 
support relieving the plaintiff of even more burdens.  Those possibilities 
are considered below. 
c.  Identifying Predatory Acts Unless a Procompetitive                          
Purpose Is Proven 
In some cases, a regulatory statute might place regulatory duties on 
firms that do not have market power.  It might adopt this approach where 
the cooperative conduct was deemed essential to effective competition, 
and waiting for the marketplace to punish uncooperative competitors 
without market power would be needlessly wasteful.  This sort of 
legislative finding is analogous to the so-called quick look approach.155  
In general, courts must exercise great caution in dispensing with market 
power analysis.  Where the legislature has determined that certain 
conduct is essential to competition irrespective of market power, 
however, courts should typically reach the same conclusion. 
Whenever antitrust liability may rest on firms without market power, 
there is a greater danger that conduct without anticompetitive effect will 
be subject to punishment.  It will therefore be appropriate in most cases 
to give the defendant the opportunity to demonstrate a procompetitive 
justification for its conduct that could not be achieved without violating 
the regulatory requirement. 
 
 154. In a private action, a plaintiff would also need to demonstrate that it suffered 
antitrust injury and otherwise had standing to pursue the action.  See Associated Gen. 
Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529–46 (1983); 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
  155. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457–59 (1986).
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d.  Acts that Are Predatory Per Se if Market Power Is Proven 
In other cases, the legislature may indicate, expressly or impliedly, 
that it intends to place regulatory duties only on firms with market 
power.  Even where the legislature does not explicitly mention market 
power, the regulatory duties it imposes may rest on the assumption that 
the burdened firms possess it.  As a regulatory program unfolds and 
competitive conditions in the marketplace change, a firm’s dominance 
may wane.  Thus, the prudent course would often be to require the 
plaintiff to prove that the defendant has market power before finding that 
the antitrust laws are violated. 
At the same time, however, the statute may indicate that the legislature 
has considered, and rejected, the possibility of procompetitive 
justifications for the failure to undertake particular conduct.  This finding 
may be inferred from specific, compulsory regulatory requirements. 
e.  Per Se Condemnation 
Finally, a legislature may condemn a competitive practice so strongly 
and without regard to market power that courts should treat that practice 
as a per se violation of the antitrust laws.  A court should adopt this level 
of connection very cautiously.  The legislature must clearly communicate 
that violating the specific duty would have no redeeming virtues.  As 
with the prior degree of separation, the duty must be compulsory and 
void of exceptions.  Beyond that, the penalty should be harsh.  For example, 
if a regulatory statute subjected violators to criminal penalties or stiff civil 
fines, per se analysis under the antitrust laws might be appropriate. 
Courts are generally reluctant to identify conduct as per se illegal under 
the antitrust laws without substantial experience with the practice.156  But 
where the legislature decides that certain conduct is anticompetitive in a 
particular industry, and adopts strong remedies against it, the courts need 
not make the difficult decision.  The legislature has reached a conclusion 
that the courts may safely implement. 
As a practical matter, no practice is per se illegal in all circumstances.  
Even price fixing requires some inquiry into market conditions before it 
is condemned.157  Courts implying per se antitrust rules from regulatory 
statutes should thus remain alert to the potential need for some 
contextual analysis.  But like the per se rules against price fixing and 
horizontal market division, transgressing a regulatory statute of this type 
would create a very strong presumption in favor of an antitrust violation.  
 
 156. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
  157. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, the presumption could be even stronger than that for per se rules 
generally because the legislature has already decided to prohibit a 
practice within a particular industry. 
V.  SEPARATION BETWEEN THE TELECOM ACT AND THE                  
ANTITRUST LAWS 
This Part applies the doctrine proposed in Part IV and concludes that 
the duties imposed by the Telecom Act can effectively coexist with 
antitrust duties.  To determine how the 1996 Act should affect antitrust 
analysis, courts need to differentiate between the two sets of duties 
imposed by the Act.  Certain duties apply to all telecom providers while 
others apply only to ILECs.  In either case, a court should presume that 
(1) a violation of the Act substantially contributes to the maintenance of 
an ILEC’s market power, but (2) a plaintiff should retain the burden of 
rebutting procompetitive justifications proven by the defendant.  For 
duties placed on all competitors, the court should not require proof of 
market power.  For ILEC only duties, however, the court should demand 
proof of market power before shifting the burden to the defendant to come 
forward with a procompetitive justification.  The final Section addresses 
the types of antitrust claims that would be entitled to this presumption. 
A.  Imposing Antitrust Duties Would Not Undermine the                
Effectiveness of the Telecom Act 
The duties generally imposed by the antitrust laws would not conflict 
with the means used by the Telecom Act to achieve its procompetitive 
goals.  The 1996 Act is designed to foster competition in local telephone 
service by requiring ILECs to provide potential competitors with the 
means to enter the market.  While the antitrust laws do not typically 
compel the sort of cooperation required by the Act, it is also not the type 
of cooperation that would ordinarily raise competitive concerns.  For 
example, the Act requires ILECs to interconnect with competitors.  
Network markets are usually interconnected because consumers demand 
it.  Bank ATM machines, methods of computer file transfer, and long 
distance telephone service are examples of situations in which 
consumers demand interconnection and marketplace forces lead to it.  
Thus, there is little fear that imposing antitrust duties would lead a firm 
to refuse to interconnect as required by the Act. 
Similarly, the Act requires ILECs to sell local service at wholesale 
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prices and essentially rent network elements—component parts of the 
network needed to provide local service—to their competitors.  Many 
manufacturers do essentially the same thing without raising antitrust 
concern.  For example, film manufacturers wholesale film for private 
label sale in competition with their own branded product, and 
automobile manufacturers provide parts, and sometimes even entire cars, 
to competitive manufacturers. 
One might argue that the extensive sharing requirements that the 1996 
Act imposes on the ILECs extend beyond the sort of sharing 
arrangements that we see in unregulated markets.  At some point, 
enforced duties to share must have anticompetitive consequences that 
would conflict with the duties imposed by the antitrust laws.  As Justice 
Breyer explained in his concurrence in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities 
Board: 
It is in the unshared, not in the shared, portions of the enterprise that meaningful 
competition would likely emerge.  Rules that force firms to share every resource 
or element of a business would create not competition, but pervasive regulation, 
for the regulators, not the marketplace, would set the relevant terms.158 
The anticompetitive effect of sharing could be particularly pernicious 
with respect to innovation.  A new firm may not strive to innovate if it 
can simply share an incumbent’s technology, and an incumbent’s incentives 
to innovate are reduced when it is forced to share the fruits of its labor.159 
These potential concerns do not reveal a conflict between the 1996 
Act and antitrust duties.  Although the statutory language is perhaps 
open to the interpretation that anticompetitive sharing is required, it is 
open to the alternative interpretation as well.  Given Congress’s purpose 
to encourage competition, the latter reading of the statute is obviously more 
appropriate.  Toward that end, the Court has required the FCC to distinguish 
those elements that must be shared from those that need not be shared.160 
Even if the Act were interpreted to require ILECs to share any 
requested element, the duties it imposes would not necessarily conflict 
with antitrust duties.  After all, the Act does not compel royalty free 
sharing.  It merely prohibits the ILEC from refusing to share, for a cost 
based royalty plus reasonable profit, when a CLEC requests access to an 
 
 158. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 429 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
  159.   Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that a firm may not “undertake the investment necessary to produce complex technological 
innovations knowing that any competitive advantage deriving from those innovations 
will be dissipated by the sharing requirement”).
  160. Id. at 386–95; see id. at 429–30 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Federal Communications Commission Adopts New Rules for Network Unbundling 
Obligations of Incumbent Local Phone Carriers, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-231344A1.pdf (Feb. 20, 2003).
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element.  Competition would persist under such a scheme so long as two 
conditions are met.  First, competition must be possible in some 
elements.  If a monopolist could always produce all elements more 
efficiently than a competitor, then competition would not emerge.  But 
the 1996 Act rests on the assumption that all aspects of local telephone 
service are not natural monopolies.  Second, the royalty must not be set 
too low.  So long as the royalty properly reflects the ILEC’s cost, plus a 
reasonable profit,161 competition in that element will emerge whenever a 
CLEC can produce the element more efficiently.  A CLEC would not 
request to share an element—and pay a cost-plus-profit-based royalty for 
it—unless it could not duplicate the element on its own at a lower cost 
than the ILEC.  All things being equal, this regime might reduce an 
ILEC’s incentive to innovate as compared with a monopoly situation in 
which innovations need not be shared.  But all things would not be 
equal.  Congress likely concluded that the competition from CLECs made 
possible by the Act would spur more innovation throughout the industry. 
While the Act on its face does not appear to raise any conflicts with 
antitrust duties, a court should go beyond an examination of the 
regulatory methods in the Act and examine other indications of 
legislative and regulatory intent.  Here again, there is much evidence to 
suggest that imposing antitrust duties would not disrupt the regulatory 
program.  The antitrust savings clauses, the 1996 Act’s legislative 
history,162 early FCC commentary,163 and contemporary statements by 
the President,164 members of Congress,165 and Joel Klein, then-Assistant 
 
 161. Setting an appropriate price through regulation has stirred debate among 
regulators, competitors, and the courts.  Cf. Iowa Utils. Bd., v. Fed. Communications 
Comm’n, 219 F.3d 744, 750 (8th Cir. 2000), rev’d sub. nom., Verizon Communications, 
Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1665–81 (2002).
  162. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 201 (1996) (explaining that the savings clause “prevents affected parties from asserting that the [Act] impliedly preempts other 
laws” and that the FCC “should be carrying out the policies of the Communications Act, 
and the DOJ should be carrying out the policies of the antitrust laws”); S. REP. NO. 104-
23, at 17 (1995) (“[T]he provisions of this bill shall not be construed to grant immunity 
from any future antitrust action against any entity referred to in the bill.”).
  163. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476, 45,494 (Aug. 29, 1996) (to be 
codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 20, 51, 90) (explaining that “nothing in [the FCC’s] 
regulations is intended to limit the ability of persons to seek relief under the antitrust 
laws”). 
 164. Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1282 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (“The Act’s emphasis on competition is also reflected in its antitrust savings 
clause.  This clause ensures that even for activities allowed under or required by the 
legislation, or activities resulting from FCC rulemaking or orders, the antitrust laws 
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Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the DOJ,166 all support the 
view that Congress saw antitrust as a helpful supplement to the duties 
imposed by the 1996 Act. 
Goldwasser expressed concern that antitrust duties might disrupt the 
Act’s mandatory negotiation and regulatory dispute resolution 
provisions.167  To the extent that this is a concern about remedy, as 
explained above, we must remember that federal judges are capable of 
tailoring remedies to avoid conflict.  A proponent of this view might 
argue, however, that the problem arises from the mere filing of a suit 
requiring a court to address the merits of a dispute not yet subjected to 
the appropriate regulatory channels.  But just as judges can tailor 
antitrust remedies to avoid regulatory conflict, the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine enables a court to tailor the timing of litigation by staying 
proceedings in an antitrust case pending the resolution of regulatory 
proceedings.168 
Goldwasser also alludes to the possibility that antitrust law might 
conflict with the 1996 Act because the Act may not have been intended 
to pursue procompetitive goals as single mindedly as antitrust law.  
While admitting that the duties imposed by the 1996 Act “do not conflict 
with the antitrust laws,” Judge Wood described them as “more specific 
and far-reaching obligations that Congress believed would accelerate the 
development of competitive markets, consistently with universal service 
(which, we note, competitive markets would not necessarily assure).”169  
While it is certainly true that Congress was concerned about maintaining 
universal service and that competition alone would not likely achieve 
that goal, the 1996 Act cannot properly be said to have the maintenance 
of universal service as a goal.  Instead, it sought to dismantle the 
regulatory devices that had been used in part to achieve universal service 
at the expense of competition in order to enable full competition to 
flourish in telephony markets.  To be sure, Congress provided a means to 
pursue universal service, but it did so in ways that would be consistent 
 
continue to apply fully.” (quoting President Clinton’s statement at the signing of the bill)).
  165. See id. at 1281 (quoting statements from Representative Conyers and Senators Thurmond and Leahy, emphasizing that “ILECs like BellSouth [should] remain subject 
to antitrust enforcement”).
  166. See Klein, supra note 33, at 7, at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/ 1268.htm (then-Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the DOJ 
explained that antitrust law may serve as a useful backup to the 1996 Act).  
 167. Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 401 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining 
that “[t]he elaborate system of negotiated agreements and enforcement established by the 
1996 Act” is not “compatible with the procedures that would be used to accomplish the 
same result under the antitrust laws”).
  168. See Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 301–02 (1973).
  169. Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 401 (emphasis added).
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with full competition.170  Congress’s desire to maintain universal service 
therefore does not create any inconsistency between antitrust duties and 
the 1996 Act. 
B.  The Telecom Act’s Effect on the Antitrust Laws 
Having rejected complete separation between the Telecom Act and 
antitrust law, a court would move to the second step of the analysis to 
determine how, if at all, the regulatory statute should affect the application 
of antitrust law.  This Section concludes that violations of the Act must be 
separated into two different categories.  First, regulatory duties imposed on 
all local carriers should be presumed to have significant anticompetitive 
effect regardless of the carrier’s market power.  Second, duties imposed 
only on ILECs should be presumed to have anticompetitive effects only if 
market power is shown.  In either case, the plaintiff should bear the burden 
of rebutting any procompetitive justifications offered by the defendant. 
1.  Rejecting the Extreme Forms of Antitrust-Telecom Connection 
The two extreme forms of antitrust-telecom connection, complete 
neutrality and per se illegality, can be readily rejected.  Congress’s 
decision to require ILECs to cooperate in certain ways communicates a 
legislative judgment that the required cooperation is procompetitive.  
That judgment is relevant to antitrust analysis, and thus, the neutrality 
position should be rejected. 
Courts should also reject the per se degree of separation.  Congress 
did not mandate specific practices.  Rather, it imposed duties in terms 
of goals and required competitors to negotiate and agree on the 
conduct necessary to achieve those goals.  Further, Congress charged 
competitors with a duty to implement the Act in the first instance 
through private negotiations.171  This structure indicates that Congress 
 
 170. In re Access Charge Reform, First Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 15,982 (1997). 
Recognizing the vulnerability of implicit subsidies to competition, Congress 
directed the Commission and the states to take the necessary steps to create 
permanent universal service mechanisms that would be secure in a competitive 
environment.  To achieve this end, Congress directed the Commission to strive 
to replace the system of implicit subsidies with “explicit and sufficient support 
mechanisms.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 171. See Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 
104 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The elaborate process of negotiation and arbitration set forth in 
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envisioned a wide variety of competitive possibilities. 
In addition, Congress chose not to impose harsh sanctions for 
violations of the Act.  Such a flexible and nonpunitive regulatory 
structure indicates that Congress did not make the sort of black and 
white findings with respect to particular competitive practices that would 
support holding a violation of a regulatory duty per se illegal. 
2.  Choosing Among the Final Three Degrees of Connection              
Requires More Careful Analysis 
At a minimum, Congress’s decision to require ILECs to interconnect 
and cooperate in certain ways should relieve an antitrust plaintiff of the 
burden of showing that an ILEC’s failure to fulfill these duties is likely 
to contribute substantially to the maintenance of the ILEC’s market 
power.  The 1996 Act constitutes a legislative finding that cooperation in 
certain areas is necessary to enable competition to serve its usual 
consumer-welfare-enhancing function.  Courts should not second-guess 
that finding. 
a.  Plaintiffs Must Prove Market Power for ILEC-Specific Duties, But 
Not for All LEC Duties 
The more difficult question is whether the 1996 Act should also 
relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving that an ILEC has market 
power and that the anticompetitive effect of the ILEC’s noncompliance 
outweighs any procompetitive justification that the ILEC may offer.  
The language of the statute does not limit the duties imposed to those 
ILECs with market power.  On the contrary, the Act explicitly imposes 
certain duties on all local telephone service providers, even though 
CLECs would almost certainly have no market power.  Congress’s 
decision to impose these duties without regard to market power 
demonstrates that it concluded that anticompetitive effects would flow 
from any carrier’s violation of these duties.  Again, courts should not 
second-guess that conclusion. 
Conversely, Congress placed certain duties only on ILECs, and it 
surely recognized that ILECs have market power.  To the extent that the 
Act introduces competition into the local telephone service market, 
however, such competition should erode the ILECs’ market power over 
time.  Arguably, if Congress wanted ILEC-specific duties to apply only 
to ILECs that retain their market power, it would have included 
 
section 252 indicates that Congress sought to allow ILECs and their competitors to govern 
their interconnection relationships directly through specific interconnection agreements 
rather than the broadly outlined duties described in subsections (b) and (c) of section 251.”).
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provisions in the statute altering the duties at that time.  By failing to 
address that contingency, Congress may have signaled a conclusion that 
even the ILEC-specific duties should apply regardless of market power. 
For the existing set of telecom-antitrust cases, the issue of whether to 
require proof of market power makes little practical difference.  The 
ILECs have it, and plaintiffs will be able to prove it.  As long as some 
element of local telephone service is best provided by a single company, 
the ILECs are likely to maintain their market power.  Indeed, Congress 
may have assumed that local loops connecting individual customers to 
the telephone system would be impossible to duplicate, leaving ILECs 
with long lasting market power despite the emergence of competition.  
But that could change.  PCS or cable telephone service could emerge as 
effective competitors to local loop service.  Should that happen, a court 
would need to carefully consider the impact of treating ILEC-specific 
duties as anticompetitive.  For example, would requiring interconnection 
at any technically feasible point within the ILEC’s network serve the 
same competitive ends if the ILEC no longer had market power?  Maybe 
not.  Congress chose not to impose that duty on local carriers unlikely to 
have market power.  Conversely, effective competition might nonetheless 
require one system to serve as a hub to which others can interconnect at 
any feasible point.  Answering that question will require a careful 
analysis of the evolved technological options that will then exist.  Until 
it can be conclusively demonstrated that ILEC-specific duties would 
enhance competition even if the ILEC has no market power, antitrust 
plaintiffs should be required to prove that an ILEC has market power. 
b.  Plaintiffs Must Rebut Procompetitive Justifications 
With respect to procompetitive justifications, the Act’s structure 
indicates that an antitrust plaintiff should continue to bear the burden of 
proof.  To be sure, the statute imposes categorical duties without 
explicitly recognizing the possibility that competition might be better 
served in some other way.  Congress’s decision to rely on private 
negotiation and mediation, rather than strict regulatory dictates, 
however, indicates that it recognized the need for flexibility in finding 
the best competitive mix.  That recognition within the Act would compel 
a court to require a plaintiff to demonstrate either that (1) the defendant 
could achieve the procompetitive justifications through means less 
restrictive than a violation of the Act, or (2) the anticompetitive effects 
outweigh the procompetitive effects. 
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C.  Evaluating Specific Antitrust Claims 
A likely critique of this approach to antitrust-telecom accommodation 
is that it would open the door to expensive and protracted litigation over 
questionable, if not frivolous, antitrust claims.  Given the open-textured 
language of the antitrust laws and the contextual nature of their 
application, a creative plaintiffs’ lawyer could frame an antitrust claim 
out of trivial violations of the Telecom Act, and the ensuing litigation 
would stifle competitive initiatives among telephone service providers. 
This is a legitimate concern.  As with all antitrust doctrine, the 
approach put forward here must be applied with careful attention to the 
ultimate goal of promoting consumer welfare.  Some claims should pose 
little debate.  Trivial violations of the Act should not be entitled to a 
presumption of anticompetitive effect.  Conversely, if an ILEC violates 
serious duties such as the number portability or equal access 
requirements, presuming anticompetitive effect should raise little 
concern.  This sort of violation bears the typical hallmarks of predatory 
conduct.  Permitting antitrust claims to be based on violations of that 
type would pose little danger of stifling truly consumer—welfare-
enhancing competition. 
Of more concern are claims that ILECs are charging prices that are too 
low to allow CLECs to compete.  A creative attorney could no doubt 
frame a price squeeze, primary-line price discrimination, or predatory 
pricing claim as a violation of the 1996 Act.  But a presumption of 
anticompetitive effect would be inappropriate in these circumstances.  
Claims alleging low pricing are treated with a cautious eye because low 
prices benefit consumers, and recognizing antitrust claims based on low 
pricing could chill what is nearly always a procompetitive practice.172  
The Telecom Act cannot reasonably be read to suggest that these 
concerns differ in the local telephone service market.  Consumers would 
not benefit if ILECs charged higher prices for their services. 
Most difficult are antitrust claims relating to the duties requiring 
ILECs to (1) provide unbundled network elements, (2) sell local service 
at wholesale for resale by a competitor, and (3) provide space at their 
facilities for a competitor’s equipment.173  Aggressive competition, like 
low pricing, nearly always benefits consumers.  Permitting antitrust 
claims resting on a failure to fulfill these cooperative duties—or worse 
 
 172. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
220–22 (1993) (discussing care needed in assessing predatory pricing and primary-line 
price discrimination cases); Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22–29 
(1st Cir. 1990) (discussing care needed in assessing price squeeze claim, particularly in a 
regulated industry).
  173. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3), (4), (6). 
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yet, presuming that a violation of these duties has anticompetitive 
effect—would arguably stifle the business freedom that drives aggressive 
competition, just as predatory pricing claims chill price cutting.174 
But price cutting and refusing to cooperate pose entirely different 
consumer welfare scenarios.  Price cutting and consumer welfare 
virtually always go hand in hand.  Whether consumers are best served by 
cooperation or the refusal to cooperate, however, depends on the context 
of the decision.  In many competitive markets, producers voluntarily 
cooperate in all of the ways that the Telecom Act requires of ILECs, and 
consumers benefit.  Firms effectively (1) rent elements of their business 
(for example, banks enable competitors to use their ATMs), (2) sell at 
wholesale to their retail competitors (for example, home appliance 
manufacturers make their products available for private labeling), and 
(3) make available the facilities necessary to enable their customers to 
deal with competitors (for example, brokerage firms include information 
about competitive mutual funds in their catalogs).  Firms make these 
accommodations to their competitors because the marketplace demands 
it.  That is, they can maximize their profits in the face of competition 
through cooperation in some areas.  And this cooperation effectively 
fosters competition on the merits in other areas.  In Aspen Skiing Co., the 
Court made clear that a firm behaves anticompetitively when it refuses 
to cooperate in the face of market conditions that make cooperation 
essential to consumer—welfare-enhancing competition in the provision 
of the ultimate product.175 
The Telecom Act is best viewed as a congressional finding that local 
telephone service, like downhill skiing in Aspen, is a market in which 
cooperation is necessary to enable competition to fully serve its 
consumer-welfare-enhancing function.  Put another way, were the local 
telephone service market competitive, market conditions would force 
providers to cooperate just as market conditions encouraged the 
operators of Aspen’s four mountains to cooperate when those mountains 
were independently owned. 
With local telephone service, however, Congress had to overcome the 
chicken and egg problem.  Monopoly local providers would not 
cooperate unless they were faced with competition.  But potential 
competitors could not effectively enter the market without cooperation.  The 
 
 174. See Covad Communications Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1286 
(11th Cir. 2002) (describing BellSouth’s arguments).
  175. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608–11 (1985).
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1996 Act addresses the chicken and egg problem by mandating the sort of 
cooperation that market forces would yield if they could operate.  Like 
Aspen Skiing Company, ILECs that violate the unbundling, resale, or 
collocation duties of the 1996 Act eschew forms of cooperation that would 
normally occur in a competitive market.176  A serious violation of any of 
these duties should thus be entitled to the presumption that it substantially 
contributes to the maintenance of the ILEC’s market power.  Encouraging 
these forms of cooperation is not anticompetitive.  On the contrary, it is the 
type of cooperation that arises when marketplace forces drive the market, 
and it ultimately benefits consumers.177 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
To a large extent, courts have always made competition policy.  The 
open-textured language of the Sherman Act has forced them to fill the void.  
In the absence of an argument supporting the superiority of the judiciary 
over the legislature in the area of competition policy-making, however, 
courts should defer to legislative decisions when they can find them.178  A 
competition-enhancing regulatory statute like the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 is an example of legislative competition policy.  Courts should 
not assume, as the Seventh Circuit has, that such a statute frees them of 
their obligation to adjudicate antitrust disputes.  Nor should courts 
assume, as the Second and Eleventh Circuits have, that they can 
continue to make competition policy in antitrust cases as they would in 
the absence of legislative guidance. 
This Article proposes an analytical framework that courts can use to 
take proper account of competition-enhancing regulation like the 1996 
Act.  First, a court must ask whether imposing antitrust duties would 
interfere with the operation of the competition enhancing regulatory 
program.  If antitrust duties would not undermine the regulation, a court 
 
 176. Those who disagree with the decision reached in Aspen Skiing Co. will have 
more difficulty recognizing the procompetitive impact of the Telecom Act.  See Glen O. 
Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 1217–23 (2002).
  177.  While it would be inappropriate to dismiss these claims at the pleading stage, a plaintiff’s burden to prove market power and to rebut procompetitive justifications 
should enable a court to resolve insubstantial claims against the plaintiff at the summary 
judgment stage.  Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
585–88 (1986). 
 178. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 10–11 (1984).  The per se rule 
against tying: 
reflects congressional policies underlying the antitrust laws.  In enacting § 3 of 
the Clayton Act . . . Congress expressed great concern about the anticompetitive 
character of tying arrangements. . . .  While this case does not arise under the 
Clayton Act, the congressional finding made therein concerning the 
competitive consequences of tying is illuminating, and must be respected. 
Id. 
SEMERARO.DOC 1/14/2020  3:52 PM 
[VOL. 40:  555, 2003]  The Antitrust-Telecom Connection 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 609 
should ask how the legislature’s competition policy should influence the 
court’s role as a policy maker in adjudicating antitrust claims.  In the 
case of the Telecom Act, Congress has declared certain cooperative 
conduct procompetitive.  Courts should defer to that legislative policy 
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